Merit-Based Transfers and Postings: A Field Experiment in Pakistan
How to cite
Olken, Benjamin; Khwaja, Asim Ijaz; Khan, Adnan. 2018. "Merit-Based Transfers and Postings: A Field Experiment in Pakistan." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002753. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2753-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Bureaucracies often post staff to better or worse locations, ostensibly to provide incentives. Yet we know little about whether this works, with heterogeneity in preferences over postings impacting effectiveness. We propose a performance-ranked serial dictatorship mechanism, whereby bureaucrats sequentially choose desired locations in order of performance. We evaluate this using a two-year field experiment with 525 property tax inspectors in Pakistan. The mechanism increases annual tax revenue growth by 30-41 percent. Inspectors that our model predicts face high equilibrium incentives under the scheme indeed increase performance more. Our results highlight the potential of periodic merit-based postings in enhancing bureaucratic performance.
Intervention
Within each of the ten major metropolitan areas in Punjab, we randomly allocated circles into groups of approximately ten circles each. At the beginning of the tax year (i.e. in July), groups were randomly selected to either participate in the MBTP scheme or to remain in the status quo. For groups selected to be in the MBTP scheme, all inspectors were told that they would be ranked based on their performance, and then based on this ranking, would be given a choice of circles within their group. Specifically, inspectors were told that if they were the top-ranked inspectors in a group they would be posted in their first-choice circle, the next ranked inspectors would be posted in their top preference from the remaining circles, and so on. Performance was calculated in two ways (randomized by group): for one sub-treatment (the “recovery” group), inspectors' performance was calculated as the year-on-year percent increase in their current circles’ tax collected collected during a fiscal year; for the other sub-treatment (the “demand” group), inspectors’ performance was calculated as the year-on-year percent increase in their current circles’ assessed tax base.
Experimental design
At the start of the first year circles were randomly assigned to be groups of 9-11 circles each, within metropolitan area. This results in 41 groups. After soliciting baseline preferences of all inspectors for circles in their assigned group, groups were randomized into treatment and control areas, stratified by metropolitan area. Within treatment areas, half the groups were randomly assigned to have performance judged by year-on-year change in tax recovery, and half were randomly assigned to have performance judged by year-on-year change in tax assessments.
In the second year, groups were randomized again into treatment and control, stratified based on their treatment in the first year.
Design details
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