Scaling Political Information Campaigns
How to cite
Casey, Katherine; Glennerster, Rachel. 2018. "Scaling Political Information Campaigns." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002703. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2703-1.1
Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.
* Primary investigator
Abstract
How do you move from a low information-low accountability political equilibrium to one where voters are informed and politicians feel pressure to perform well? This paper explores two main constraints to this equilibrium shift in the context of a national scale up of a political information campaign in Sierra Leone. The first captures general barriers to scaling a controlled demonstration pilot to serve a much broader population, and the second asks when politicians have incentives (or not) to participate in initiatives that inform voters.
Intervention
Many successful pilot projects in international aid fail to scale up to serve the broader population of the host country. We study barriers to scaling from multiple angles in the context of a political information campaign in Sierra Leone.
As background, results from a 2012 pilot implemented by Search for Common Ground (SFCG) suggest that hosting debates between Parliamentary (MP) candidates from rival political parties and disseminating them via large public film screenings was highly effective in educating voters, informing their vote choices, and increasing accountability pressure on elected MPs (Bidwell, Casey and Glennerster 2016). On the strength of these results, SFCG raised funds to scale their debates pilot to cover nearly half of all Parliamentary constituencies nationwide in 2018. The first component of this research explores whether the original model can be stretched to reach more voters at lower cost; voter willingness to incur travel costs to access information; and whether debate dissemination can be brought into the business model of private cinema halls.
While debates have become quite common in elections around the world, it is not always easy to convince candidates to participate in them. Frontrunners, for instance, often refuse the invitation from rival party candidates or news organizations to participate in debates, presumably as the downside risk of a bad performance outweighs any potential benefits. On the other hand, if one viable candidate agrees to participate, and a media outlet commits to broadcasting it, the incentives tip toward broader participation as reluctant candidates fear losing out on the free campaign publicity. The second component of this research tests a simple model of a candidate's decision to participate in an initiative that informs voters and sees how it changes with the introduction of a guaranteed broadcast platform.
Experimental design
Component 1: Random assignment of SFCG video debates across 45 of 90 constituencies. Within constituencies, data collection will occur in the constituency headquarters, and three VRCs randomly selected from the 25th to 75th percentile of size distribution. In treated constituencies, the primary public screening will be held in constituency headquarters, and then the three randomly selected VRCs will host a secondary screening, mobilization only and control, respectively.
Design details
Cited by
No citation data available for this registration yet.