Tax Compliance Among Small Firms in Rwanda
How to cite
Tourek, Gabriel. 2018. "Tax Compliance Among Small Firms in Rwanda." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002701. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2701-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
How do small firms navigate tax compliance in low enforcement environments? Using the population of administrative tax declarations by Rwandan firms from 2008 to 2016 to evaluate a 2012 reform in Rwanda that introduced an income tax exemption threshold, we find that firms previously below the exemption threshold on average double the amount of taxable income reported to the tax authority and increase the amount of tax paid by 60 percent in the post-reform period. Potential mechanisms behind this response include overestimation of the likelihood of experiencing an audit, the influence of peers on the declaration decision, and changes in the actual likelihood of experiencing enforcement resulting from the choices of local peers. In order to identify which of these mechanisms explain the observed behavior, we will conduct a survey of 1,000 taxpayers to collect detailed information on the tax compliance decisions of small firms and assess their responses to information through an experimental approach. The survey will measure how the characteristics of firms differ across amounts of reported taxable income in order to understand the responses observed in the quasi-experimental analysis. The survey will contain an information experiment, the design of which is detailed in the pre-analysis plan. The experiment addresses the potential mechanisms by assessing how taxpayers respond to information about (1) the likelihood of experiencing an audit or review from the tax authority and (2) the declaration choices of local peers. Outcomes will be assessed through a survey experiment approach and by observing the actual post-treatment tax declarations made by firms in the sample.
Intervention
(1) Audit information (high vs. low) Information on the likelihood of experiencing an audit will be drawn directly from Rwanda Revenue Authority data on audits and reviews for fiscal year 2016. The information communicated to taxpayers will provide either a high or low number of audits. For the high audit probability group, taxpayers having declared turnover previously within the exemption zone (below 2 million RWF) will be told that the RRA conducted 1,243 audits of taxpayers like them and that this represents a high number of audits and a high audit likelihood. For the low audit probability group, taxpayers having declared turnover previously just to the right of the exemption zone (at 2 million RWF) will be told that the RRA conducted only 37 audits of taxpayers like them — computed by observing audits in fiscal year 2016 for the income bin from which the sample will be drawn, 0 to 4 million RWF — and told that this represents an extremely low audit likelihood for taxpayers like them.
(2) Peer information (above vs. below exemption zone) Information about the behavior of peers will be crossed with the audit treatments only. The high audit treatment will be crossed with information provided about the proportion of taxpayers (30%) like the respondent choosing to locate at precisely 2 million RWF (just to the right of the exemption zone). The low audit treatment will be crossed with information about the proportion of taxpayers like the respondent who locate within the exemption zone (37%). “Taxpayers like the respondent” is defined as havingg declared between 0 and 4 million RWF previously, and the proportions are drawn from RRA data on the population of taxpayers from fiscal year 2016.
(3) Control Taxpayers assigned to the control group will receive a message about the proportion of taxpayers like them who declared their income tax returns on time before the official deadline for fiscal year 2016 (95%). This information could shift when taxpayers declare relative to the other information treatments but should not affect the amount of income declared as it only communicates information about the timing rather than the content of income tax declaration.
Experimental design
The unit of randomization for the information treatments is the taxpayer. Each of the 1,000 taxpayers will be randomly assigned to a treatment group (depending on the sample group to which they belong) with equal probability. Randomization will occur within the survey instrument: a random number will be generated by the tablet used to conduct the survey and this number will be used to assign the respondent to a treatment arm during survey data collection. We are not able to randomize ex ante due to concerns about differential response rates — within-survey randomization ensures that all taxpayers who reach the treatment section of the survey instrument have equal probability of being assigned to possible arms within their sample group.
We are reasonably confident that spillovers in our context are not a concern. The individual level treatments (titling, information, rate) will only be provided to individual businesses, the locations of which we can observe in the RRA administrative data. It is possible that taxpayers could share information with others, but given that the sampling frame is the entire population of taxpaying firms declaring between greater than 0 but less than or equal to 2 million RWF (approximately 15,000 firms), we expect the probability of interactions between taxpayers within our sample to be extremely low. We can test ex post whether geographic locations with a greater (lesser) diversity of treatment assignment have attenuated (strengthened) responses to information; however, assessing spillovers will not be a focus of this study.
Design details
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