The Efficiency Impact of Regulatory Uncertainty: An Experimental Study

How to cite

Blackwell, Calvin; Sobel, Russell. 2018. "The Efficiency Impact of Regulatory Uncertainty: An Experimental Study." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002675. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2675-1.0

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Calvin Blackwell* , Russell Sobel

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0002675
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2675-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2018-01-29 – 2018-12-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2675

Abstract

We design an experiment to examine the impact of regulatory uncertainty on efficiency. We use a double-auction design as a baseline and then examine two regulatory regimes: a known tax and an unknown, retroactively applied tax. That is, in the second regime participants are told there is the possibility that a tax will be imposed on any transactions made, but subjects do not find out if the tax will be imposed until after the double auction is completed. We compare the efficiency of the market with the known tax to that of the market with the unknown tax. We have two primary competing hypotheses: 1) the lost efficiency with the unknown tax will be less than with the known tax or 2) the lost efficiency with the unknown tax will be more that with the know tax.

Intervention

We design an experiment to examine the impact of regulatory uncertainty on efficiency. We use a double-auction design as a baseline and then examine two regulatory regimes: a known tax and an unknown, retroactively applied tax. That is, in the second regime participants are told there is the possibility that a tax will be imposed on any transactions made, but subjects do not find out if the tax will be imposed until after the double auction is completed. We compare the efficiency of the market with the known tax to that of the market with the unknown tax. The unknown tax treatment will have two sub-treatments: a regime in which participants are told the probability that the tax will be imposed, and a regime in which the participants are merely told that the tax could occur, but are not given a precise probability. In both sub-treatments the actual probability of the tax being imposed will be 0.5.

Experimental design

We design an experiment to examine the impact of regulatory uncertainty on efficiency. We use a double-auction design as a baseline and then examine two regulatory regimes: a known tax and an unknown, retroactively applied tax. That is, in the second regime participants are told there is the possibility that a tax will be imposed on any transactions made, but subjects do not find out if the tax will be imposed until after the double auction is completed. We compare the efficiency of the market with the known tax to that of the market with the unknown tax. The unknown tax treatment will have two sub-treatments: a regime in which participants are told the probability that the tax will be imposed, and a regime in which the participants are merely told that the tax could occur, but are not given a precise probability. In both sub-treatments the actual probability of the tax being imposed will be 0.5.

Design details

Randomization method
Coin flip
Randomization unit
Individual level randomization. Participants are randomly assigned to a treatment.
Clusters
Experimental sessions will be run with 10 or 20 participants at a time. We plan to start with 4 sessions.
Observations
Initial set of sessions will include 60 participants.
Arms
We plan to use 20 participants in our 2 control sessions, and then 20 participants in each of the sub-treatments (known probability vs unknown probability of tax).
Primary outcomes
We will measure the economic surplus generated under each treatment. The ratio of actual surplus to potential surplus generated will be used as our measure of efficiency. We will compare efficiency under each treatment.

Cited by

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Keywords