The Efficiency Impact of Regulatory Uncertainty: An Experimental Study
How to cite
Blackwell, Calvin; Sobel, Russell. 2018. "The Efficiency Impact of Regulatory Uncertainty: An Experimental Study." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002675. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2675-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We design an experiment to examine the impact of regulatory uncertainty on efficiency. We use a double-auction design as a baseline and then examine two regulatory regimes: a known tax and an unknown, retroactively applied tax. That is, in the second regime participants are told there is the possibility that a tax will be imposed on any transactions made, but subjects do not find out if the tax will be imposed until after the double auction is completed. We compare the efficiency of the market with the known tax to that of the market with the unknown tax. We have two primary competing hypotheses: 1) the lost efficiency with the unknown tax will be less than with the known tax or 2) the lost efficiency with the unknown tax will be more that with the know tax.
Intervention
We design an experiment to examine the impact of regulatory uncertainty on efficiency. We use a double-auction design as a baseline and then examine two regulatory regimes: a known tax and an unknown, retroactively applied tax. That is, in the second regime participants are told there is the possibility that a tax will be imposed on any transactions made, but subjects do not find out if the tax will be imposed until after the double auction is completed. We compare the efficiency of the market with the known tax to that of the market with the unknown tax. The unknown tax treatment will have two sub-treatments: a regime in which participants are told the probability that the tax will be imposed, and a regime in which the participants are merely told that the tax could occur, but are not given a precise probability. In both sub-treatments the actual probability of the tax being imposed will be 0.5.
Experimental design
We design an experiment to examine the impact of regulatory uncertainty on efficiency. We use a double-auction design as a baseline and then examine two regulatory regimes: a known tax and an unknown, retroactively applied tax. That is, in the second regime participants are told there is the possibility that a tax will be imposed on any transactions made, but subjects do not find out if the tax will be imposed until after the double auction is completed. We compare the efficiency of the market with the known tax to that of the market with the unknown tax. The unknown tax treatment will have two sub-treatments: a regime in which participants are told the probability that the tax will be imposed, and a regime in which the participants are merely told that the tax could occur, but are not given a precise probability. In both sub-treatments the actual probability of the tax being imposed will be 0.5.
Design details
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