Economic Game Study [Redistributive Behaviour and the Self-Serving Bias]

How to cite

Ward-Griffin, Peter; Francois, Patrick. 2018. "Economic Game Study [Redistributive Behaviour and the Self-Serving Bias]." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002654. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2654-3.0

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Peter Ward-Griffin* , Patrick Francois

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0002654
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2654-3.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2018-02-28 – 2018-08-15
Countries
Private
JEL codes
D91; D81; H23
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2654

Abstract

In a situation where individuals are uncertain about whether their level of earnings is due to chance or their own performance, are they more likely to attribute higher earnings levels to performance and lower earnings levels to chance? If so, does this “self-serving bias” decrease the amount of money individuals are willing to redistribute to others who earned less?

Using an experimental game setting, I examine differences in redistributive behaviour among individuals based on their earnings determinant (performance, chance, or uncertain). I will first examine whether people have different rates and levels of redistribution depending on their earnings determinant. I will then examine whether earnings level affects perceived earnings determinant. Finally, I will examine differences in redistributive behaviour among individuals who have different beliefs about payment type who are in uncertain payment attribution groups.

Intervention

Participants will be randomly chosen to have their earnings level determined by performance or chance and half of them will be told their earnings determinant while the other half will have their earnings determinant unknown. I examine the impact of this on redistributive behaviour among high payment participants and redistributive demand among low payment participants. I also examine whether individuals who have uncertain payment types are more likely to attribute payment to performance than chance when they have higher earnings.

Experimental design

2 by 2 by 2 completely between subjects design with 50 subjects per group.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization of individuals into groups was done by Qualtrics Survey software randomization tool, using the "equal randomization" option.
Randomization unit
Individual randomization
Clusters
400 Students
Observations
400 Students
Arms
50 students in KRH, 50 students in KRL, 50 students in URH, 50 students in URL, 100 students in KP (of which approximately 50 will be in each of KPH and KPL), 100 students in UP (of which approximately 50 will be in each of UPH and UPL).
Primary outcomes
Redistribution amount (in $), Redistribution demanded (in $), Redistribution(Yes ,No), Believed payment determinant (chance or performance),
Secondary outcomes
Perception of the fairness of the allocation (Is it is fair that, prior to redistribution, some individuals in this study receive $14 and others $1? Very Unfair-Very Fair) , political ideology (1-10 Left-Right individual scale, five item scale, individual statement: "Governments should redistribute income from the better off to those who are less well off.") Strongly Disagree-Strongly Agree 7 point scale)

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords