Economic Game Study [Redistributive Behaviour and the Self-Serving Bias]
How to cite
Ward-Griffin, Peter; Francois, Patrick. 2018. "Economic Game Study [Redistributive Behaviour and the Self-Serving Bias]." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002654. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2654-3.0
Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.
* Primary investigator
Abstract
In a situation where individuals are uncertain about whether their level of earnings is due to chance or their own performance, are they more likely to attribute higher earnings levels to performance and lower earnings levels to chance? If so, does this “self-serving bias” decrease the amount of money individuals are willing to redistribute to others who earned less?
Using an experimental game setting, I examine differences in redistributive behaviour among individuals based on their earnings determinant (performance, chance, or uncertain). I will first examine whether people have different rates and levels of redistribution depending on their earnings determinant. I will then examine whether earnings level affects perceived earnings determinant. Finally, I will examine differences in redistributive behaviour among individuals who have different beliefs about payment type who are in uncertain payment attribution groups.
Intervention
Participants will be randomly chosen to have their earnings level determined by performance or chance and half of them will be told their earnings determinant while the other half will have their earnings determinant unknown. I examine the impact of this on redistributive behaviour among high payment participants and redistributive demand among low payment participants. I also examine whether individuals who have uncertain payment types are more likely to attribute payment to performance than chance when they have higher earnings.
Experimental design
2 by 2 by 2 completely between subjects design with 50 subjects per group.
Design details
Cited by
No citation data available for this registration yet.