Work Meaning and Labor Supply
How to cite
Kesternich, Iris; Siflinger, Bettina; Schumacher, Heiner. 2017. "Work Meaning and Labor Supply." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002651. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2651-1.0
Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.
* Primary investigator
Abstract
Long-term unemployment imposes large costs on both individuals and society. Reducing long-term unemployment therefore is of first-order importance for public policy. In this project, we analyze to what extent work meaning – the significance of a job for others or for society – increases the willingness to accept a job and job performance of employed and unemployed individuals. To this end, we conduct a large-scale online experiment with a representative sample of the population. All of our subjects participate in the “Panel Study of Labour Market and Social Security” (PASS) of the German Labour Agency. In the experiment, we offer a job that can be completed from home. We elicit subjects’ reservation wage for this job through the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism. The treatment variation is the description of the job as having either “high” or “low” meaning. To study heterogeneity in subjects’ reservation wages, we link their behaviour in the experiment to rich survey and administrative data provided by PASS.
Experimental design
We oer subjects a job that takes an hour to complete. Their task in the job is to digitize scanned PDF documents from the medical faculty of the University of Munich). Subjects can work from home using their own computer. No particular skills are equipment are needed to perform
the job. Subjects receive their salary after working on the job for one hour. In the experiment, we elicit subject’s reservation wage for the job. To this end, we apply the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism, which is a standard tool in experimental economics to elicit reservation values. After describing the job, subjects are asked at which wage between 9 and 35 Euros they are willing to work for one hour. The computer then randomly draws a number x between 9 and 35. If this number x is (weakly) above the respondent’s reservation wage, the respondent is admitted to the job and is paid a wage of x. Otherwise, the experiment ends. This procedure ensures that each subject has an incentive to indicate the true reservation wage. We also included the option to state that a subjects does not want to accept the job even if the wage is 35 Euros. Our goal is to check how the reservation wage and productivity during the job changes with the meaning of work. We therefore assign subjects to two treatments that vary in the description of the job, i.e., the high-meaning treatment or the low-meaning treatment. In the high-meaning treatment, we informed subjects that the documents they enter would be relevant for future research at the medical faculty. In contrast, in the low-meaning treatment, we told subjects that the documents would be stored, but most likely would not be used in the future.
Design details
Cited by
No citation data available for this registration yet.