Designing Performance Indicators for Career Incentives

How to cite

Wang, Shaoda; He, Guojun; Zhang, Qiong; Janvry, Alain de; Sadoulet, Elisabeth. 2017. "Designing Performance Indicators for Career Incentives." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002621. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2621-1.0

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Shaoda Wang* , Guojun He , Qiong Zhang , Alain de Janvry , Elisabeth Sadoulet

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0002621
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2621-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2017-09-01 – 2018-08-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
O15, J45, P26
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2621

Abstract

In this study, we test theoretical predictions in the contract theory and personnel economics literature that subjective performance evaluations could suffer from two major issues: (1) delegation to an evaluating leader could induce favoritism and influence activities, which could be solved by creating ex ante uncertainty in the identity of the evaluating leader; and (2) principal and agent could have misaligned beliefs about the agent's performance, which could be solved by creating timely feedback between them.
We partner with provincial governments in Henan Province and Guangdong Province in China, and conduct a field experiment by randomly imposing different evaluation schemes to 4000 College Graduates Village Officials (CGVOs) in these two provinces. Having informed each CGVO at the beginning of the evaluation year about what his evaluation scheme would be, we observe whether his performance would change accordingly over the evaluation year, as predicted by theory. We use non-incentivized dimensions of performance as benchmark measures for welfare.

Intervention

Help the government design a 5-arm evaluation scheme, introducing uncertainty about the identity of the evaluating leader, and introducing mid-term feedbacks between the evaluating leader and the CGVOs. The government randomly imposes each evaluation scheme on different students. The evaluation schemes are announced by the government at the beginning of the evaluation cycle, we wait a year to see the outcomes.

Experimental design

We have five different evaluation schemes, randomly imposed to different state employees in two provinces. Compared to the status quo, these arms introduce uncertainty in the identity of the evaluating leader, and introduce interim feedback between principal and agent, which in theory would improve the motivating effect of a subjective evaluation.

Design details

Randomization method
randomization done in office by a computer
Randomization unit
Randomization is done at government unit level.
Clusters
1400 government units.
Observations
4000 state employees.
Arms
800 T1, 800 T2, 800 T3, 800 T4, 800 T5
Primary outcomes
Leader evaluation, colleague evaluation, self evaluation, attendance records, extra hours, villager satisfaction rates.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords