The hidden costs of malus contracts

How to cite

Essl, Andrea; Bieberstein, Frauke; Friedrich, Kathrin. 2017. "The hidden costs of malus contracts." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002605. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2605-1.1

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Andrea Essl* , Frauke Bieberstein , Kathrin Friedrich

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0002605
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2605-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2017-12-05 – 2018-12-31
Countries
Germany ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2605

Abstract

This laboratory experiment is aimed at examining the effect of malus contracts in a principal agent relationship. In particular, we want to understand whether the agent’s experience of a malus (having to pay back money to the principal) subsequently leads to a decrease in reciprocal behavior of the agent toward the principal. In order to study this question we will compare behavior in a malus treatment to behavior in a payoff-equivalent bonus treatment. Reciprocity is measured as behavior of the agent in the role of the trustee in a trust game. We will also consider whether the principal anticipates the agent’s choice by studying her decision in the role of the trustor. *In addition, we will examine the contract choice of the principal for the initial real-effort task, the number of tasks solved by the agent in the real-effort task and the impact of loss and risk aversion on all of the above outcomes. The intervention is a between-subject design.

Intervention

Between-subject design. Two treatments: malus treatment and gain treatment.

Experimental design

Between-subject design. Pairs of principal and agent are randomly formed. The principal decides on the contract for the agent for a real-effort task. In the malus (bonus) treatment, the principal can choose between a fixed wage and a malus (bonus) contract. After the initial payments, the agent works on the real-effort task and receives the bonus/pays the malus depending on the treatment. Then, a trust game is played with the principal as trustor and the agent as trustee. In addition, we elicit individual loss and risk aversion and baseline performance. Finally, participants fill out an unincentivized questionnaire.

Design details

Randomization method
Computer (lab experiment)
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
-
Observations
In total about 170 participants
Arms
About 85 participants in bonus treatment, about 85 participants in malus treatment
Primary outcomes
Money returned by trustee (the agent) in a trust game. In addition, we will consider money transferred by trustor (principal), contract choice of principal, number of tasks solved by agent in real-effort task, impact of loss and risk aversion on above outcomes. We will control for individual differences as given by the questionnaire.

Papers from this trial

  1. von Bieberstein, F. & Essl, A. & Kathrin Friedrich (2020). Gain versus loss contracts: Does contract framing affect agents’ reciprocity?, Economics Letters, 187,108846. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108846

Cited by

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Keywords