Manager preferences, goal setting and firm performance: Insights from a randomized field experiment

How to cite

Quang, Nguyen; Rascon, Ericka; Kim, Trang. 2017. "Manager preferences, goal setting and firm performance: Insights from a randomized field experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002599. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2599-2.0

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Nguyen Quang* , Ericka Rascon , Trang Kim

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0002599
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2599-2.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2018-01-08 – 2019-12-12
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2599

Abstract

An emerging strand of literature suggests that managers matter. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) focus on managerial fixed effects in driving corporate policies. Other studies explore the link between managerial overconfidence and firm behavior (Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008); and between CEO’s characteristics in private equity firms with outcome success (Kaplan, Klebanov, and Sorensen, 2010). Along this line, we aim to explore the two following related questions. The first question focuses on the link between manager’s preferences i.e., risk and time preferences and firm’s performance. Specifically, we want to know whether the manager’s tendency to deviate from rationality i.e., manager’s behavioral problems due to loss aversion and present bias have a negative impact on firm’s performance. Our second question examines whether providing managers with simple intervention to address their behavioral problems would improve firm’s performance.

Intervention

In this project we explore key insights from behavioral economics: Prospect theory, and present bias preference; and we focus on their role in driving firm performance. We conduct the project in two stages as follows. In the first stage, we use a survey-based approach to have baseline information on the manager’s risk and time preferences, firm’s financial planning practice, and firm performance. In the second stage, we conduct a randomized field experiment i.e., RCT to explore whether providing manager with behaviors targeted solutions – using goal setting -improves firm performance.

Experimental design

In this project we explore key insights from behavioral economics: Prospect theory, and present bias preference; and we focus on their role in driving firm performance. We conduct the project in two stages as follows. In the first stage, we use a survey-based approach to have baseline information on the manager’s risk and time preferences, firm’s financial planning practice, and firm performance. In the second stage, we conduct a randomized field experiment i.e., RCT to explore whether providing manager with behaviors targeted solutions – using goal setting -improves firm performance.

Design details

Randomization method
We implement the randomization using Stata software.
Randomization unit
Economic regions.
Clusters
8 economic regions.
Observations
900 small firms in garment and textile industries.
Arms
• TG0 (300 firms): Control group: firms don’t receive any treatment • TG1 (300 firms): Our research team conducts monthly surveys about firm’s sale levels in the last month. The survey has a salient effect on reminding firms i.e., giving feedback on their performance. • TG2 (300 firms): Similar to TG1, plus managers are asked to set monthly sales target. Our research team also conducts monthly surveys about firm’s sale levels in the last month. Our treatment will use narrow-bracketing goal i.e., monthly target of sales to address manager’s present bias and loss aversion.
Primary outcomes
Improvement in performance among small firms in emerging economies.

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Keywords