Salience and Timely Compliance: Experimental Evidence from the Enforcement of Speeding Tickets

How to cite

Traxler, Christian; Dusek, Libor; Pardo, Nicolas. 2017. "Salience and Timely Compliance: Experimental Evidence from the Enforcement of Speeding Tickets." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002594. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2594-1.2

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Christian Traxler* , Libor Dusek , Nicolas Pardo

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0002594
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2594-1.2
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2017-12-01 – 2019-11-15
Countries
Czechia (Suburbian Region of Prague (Říčany and others))
JEL codes
C93 (field experiment), D83 (belief, unawareness), D91 (Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making)
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2594

Abstract

In many domains, authorities rely on sending notifications to enforce compliance with outstanding payments. Typically there are laws that impose constraints on format and content of the notifications. As a result, the key information is often presented in a way that is hard to understand, making it difficult to correctly infer important attributes of the payment liabilities. This is crucial, as many of these attributes play - at least for a fully rational, attentive and cognitively unconstrained decision maker - a significant role in shaping individual responses to the notifications. This project studies the impact from increasing the salience of different attributes hidden in such complex legal texts. In particular, we focus on payment notifications for drivers who receive speeding tickets. Within a randomized controlled trial, we vary whether the payment deadline, the penalty for missing the deadline, or both features of the notification are made salient to the receiver. We then study the treatments' impact on the timing of payments for the speeding tickets.

Intervention

We use cover letters to augment a legal text. Different cover letters aim at increasing the salience of different enforcement parameters.

Experimental design

We conduct a randomized control trial with the universe of recipients of speeding violation tickets during the period of the study. Each speeding case is randomly allocated into a control group or one of three treatments. Due to technical constraints at our cooperation partner, the randomization will not use any stratification.

Our experimental approach is based on a 2 x 2 factorial design. All speeders in all groups receive the legal notification message, i.e., the usual summons used by the enforcement authority. Three treatment groups [T1-T3] will receive an additional cover letter. The control group [T0] does not get any cover letter. The cover letter includes a simple text that aims at communicating in a clear way either the deadline, the costs associated with not paying the fine on time, or both. (Note that a subset of speeders, in particular, cars registered for companies that use an electronic way of communicating with authorities, will receive the cover letter (as well as the legal notification) as a PDF.)

Design details

Randomization method
The randomization will be made by a computer (using software installed at the municipality office). The software draws a random number and, based on this number, assigns each case to one of the four conditions T0, T1, T2 or T3 (with a rate of 1/4 each).
Randomization unit
Speeding ticket
Clusters
At this stage, there is unfortunately considerable ambiguity regarding the length of the trial (at least 9 month) and regarding the number of observations collected during this time period (speeders who will get a ticket). Based on what we know, this could be anywhere between 5,000 to 20,000 speeding tickets.
Observations
We would aim at 20,000 speeding tickets, but -- as pointed out above -- there is considerable ambiguity whether we could reach this number.
Arms
Sample Size / 4. I.e., if we would reach the planned 20,000 experimental speeding tickets, this would be 5,000 per treatment.
Primary outcomes
We will calculate the effect of our treatments on the payment decision of the individuals by comparing payment rates across treatments for full compliance (i.e., for the payment of all fines). Our primary outcomes will be based on (1) timely compliance (pre-deadline payments) and (2) payments within 30 days. Moreover, (3) we consider the exact timing of the (first) payment.
Secondary outcomes
In addition to full payments, we will also consider partial payments ("any"-payment-made-indicators). We will again assess these for the time frames from above (payments within 15 and 30 days). To capture mid-run treatment effects on compliance, however, we will also estimate models for our outcome variables (full/partial compliance) defined over a longer time frame of 60 and 100 days. If we are able to merge our data with information on future driving/speeding behavior, we will also examine treatment effects on subsequent driving behavior.

Papers from this trial

  1. Dusek, Libor, Nicolas Pardo, and Christian Traxler (2020), Salience, Incentives, and Timely Compliance: Evidence from Speeding Tickets, Discussion Paper 2020/09, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. https://ideas.repec.org/p/mpg/wpaper/2020_09.html
  2. Dušek, L., Pardo, N. and Traxler, C. (2022), Salience and Timely Compliance: Evidence from Speeding Tickets. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 41, p.426-449. https://doi.org/10.1002/pam.22387 https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/pam.22387

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Keywords