Salience and Timely Compliance: Experimental Evidence from the Enforcement of Speeding Tickets
How to cite
Traxler, Christian; Dusek, Libor; Pardo, Nicolas. 2017. "Salience and Timely Compliance: Experimental Evidence from the Enforcement of Speeding Tickets." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002594. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2594-1.2
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
In many domains, authorities rely on sending notifications to enforce compliance with outstanding payments. Typically there are laws that impose constraints on format and content of the notifications. As a result, the key information is often presented in a way that is hard to understand, making it difficult to correctly infer important attributes of the payment liabilities. This is crucial, as many of these attributes play - at least for a fully rational, attentive and cognitively unconstrained decision maker - a significant role in shaping individual responses to the notifications. This project studies the impact from increasing the salience of different attributes hidden in such complex legal texts. In particular, we focus on payment notifications for drivers who receive speeding tickets. Within a randomized controlled trial, we vary whether the payment deadline, the penalty for missing the deadline, or both features of the notification are made salient to the receiver. We then study the treatments' impact on the timing of payments for the speeding tickets.
Intervention
We use cover letters to augment a legal text. Different cover letters aim at increasing the salience of different enforcement parameters.
Experimental design
We conduct a randomized control trial with the universe of recipients of speeding violation tickets during the period of the study. Each speeding case is randomly allocated into a control group or one of three treatments. Due to technical constraints at our cooperation partner, the randomization will not use any stratification.
Our experimental approach is based on a 2 x 2 factorial design. All speeders in all groups receive the legal notification message, i.e., the usual summons used by the enforcement authority. Three treatment groups [T1-T3] will receive an additional cover letter. The control group [T0] does not get any cover letter. The cover letter includes a simple text that aims at communicating in a clear way either the deadline, the costs associated with not paying the fine on time, or both. (Note that a subset of speeders, in particular, cars registered for companies that use an electronic way of communicating with authorities, will receive the cover letter (as well as the legal notification) as a PDF.)
Design details
Papers from this trial
- Dusek, Libor, Nicolas Pardo, and Christian Traxler (2020), Salience, Incentives, and Timely Compliance: Evidence from Speeding Tickets, Discussion Paper 2020/09, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. https://ideas.repec.org/p/mpg/wpaper/2020_09.html
- Dušek, L., Pardo, N. and Traxler, C. (2022), Salience and Timely Compliance: Evidence from Speeding Tickets. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 41, p.426-449. https://doi.org/10.1002/pam.22387 https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/pam.22387
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