How scarcity affects borrowing decisions in groups
How to cite
Diekert, Florian; Brekke, Kjell. 2017. "How scarcity affects borrowing decisions in groups." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002582. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2582-3.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
When the means to an end are scarce, decisions makers focus their attention, using available resources most effectively. However, this increased focus comes at a cost. Decision makers lose oversight and neglect important but less pressing long-term projects. They borrow too much and overall performance decreases as a consequence. Until now, this research has concentrated on individual decision makers. We study how scarcity affects borrowing decisions in groups. Do groups also neglect long-term projects under scarcity? Do groups borrow to meet the needs of the present, and thereby compromise the ability to meet their needs in the future, to the same extent as individuals do? Our experimental design builds directly on the 4th experiment of Shah et al (Science, 338 (6107): 682-685, 2012). We replicate their experiment and add three treatments where one player can borrow time from another player.
Experimental design
Our experimental design builds directly on the 4th experiment of Shah et al (2012). We replicate their experiment and add three new treatments.
Subjects are recruited via Amazon's mechanical turk platform and perform an online task. We call the underlying task the "Guessing Game". The game is modeled after the TV-show "Family Feud": Subjects are faced with a question (for example, name things that you take on a picnic) and have to guess which answers were most popular among a random sample of 100 people. Subjects earn one point per correct answer, but they only have a limited amount of time per question. (Points are later exchanged into real money.) The key treatment is whether subjects have an abundant or a scarce time budget, that is, whether they have more (50 seconds) or less (15 seconds) time available per question. There are 12 questions in our version of the Guessing Game.
In all treatments subjects are matched randomly and anonymously in pairs and play sequentially. In other words, one subject plays first and the other subject plays second. The payoff for each subject is their total group payoff. All subjects can borrow from their own future questions at a 100% rate, that is: if a subject spends 5 seconds more on one question, the time available for later questions is reduced by 10 seconds. As in Shah et al (2012), time can be banked: When a subject goes to the next question before the available time for the current question is over, the remaining time is added to the time budget. This option is available after 40% of the per-period time has elapsed.
The fundamental distinction between treatments is whether the first subject can borrow time from the second subject. If this is possible, we say the group has a joint time budget. If this is not possible, we say that each subject has an individual time budget. As the individual payoff is always simply the group payoff, the individual time budget treatments neutralize all strategic effects on the borrowing decisions. The difference between the abundance and scarcity treatments under individual time budgets can thus indeed be seen as single-player treatments and they can be used to replicate the effect of scarcity on borrowing decisions of Shah et al (2012). Finally, there is one treatment with a virtual second player, played by a computer, and only the first player receives a payoff. In contrast to Shah et al (2012), there is no "no borrowing" treatment.
Design details
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