In decision theory, people may behave differently when faced with unknown risks compared to known risks. We call unknown risks "ambiguity". One possibility is that a person may be averse to ambiguity and, therefore, prefer to face a known risk, all else equal. A famous experiment proposed by Ellsberg in 1961 provides a concrete experiment in which many people indeed choose a known risk over an unknown risk. In fact, this behavior is not consistent with traditional models of decision making and has motivated a literature that captures such "ambiguity averse" behavior. Our experiments are designed to test (i) to what extent this behavior can be interpreted as aversion to ambiguity in experiments closely related to Ellsberg's experiments, and (ii) to what extent people might behave differently when we describe how and why to avoid the unknown risk through a "hedging" process that involves basing their choice on the outcome of a coin flip.
Intervention
Lab experiments.
Experimental design
In an Ellsberg-inspired environment, we do two things: 1) We elicit preferences over acts in an environment where Ellsbergian behavior is inconsistent with most models of ambiguity aversion. 2) We elicit preferences over acts when subjects have been exposed to Raiffa's hedging argument.
Design details
Randomization method
All subjects will be recruited from the lab's registry. Subjects are randomly allocated to one of the treatments via the experimental session they sign up for.
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
na
Observations
350 undergraduate students
Arms
11 treatments, with the following sample sizes:
1) Observe preliminary draws: 30
For the remaining, the coding is as follows:
A=exposed to arguments before incentivized decision
N=not exposed to arguments before incentivized decision
"3"=coin flip by experimenter is not an option; the only options are white/green/yellow
"4"=a fourth option to bet according to an experimenter-implemented coin flip is available
V0=video describing virtual coin toss to implement lottery between green/yellow bets
V1=video with argument in favor of using coin toss
V2=video with argument against using coin toss
2) A3 V0,V1 sample size=10
3) A3 V0,V1,V2 sample size=10
4) A4 V1 sample size=10
5) A4 V2 sample size=10
6) A4 V1,V2 sample size=15
7) A4 V2,V1 sample size=15
8) N3 V0,V1 sample size=20
9) N3 V0,V1,V2 sample size=20
10) N4 V1,V2 sample size=10
11) N4 V2,V1 sample size=10
Primary outcomes
The proportion of subjects betting white after YG and GY preliminary draws in (1).
The proportion of subjects with “Ellsbergian” behavior before and after we provide the arguments above in (2).
Secondary outcomes
The full profile of preferences in (1).
The proportion of Ellsbergian behavior in (2) after various combinations of observing the arguments and conditional on whether the coin is physically flipped by experimenters or, instead, a mental device employed by the individual subject.
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