Turning Up, Tuning In, Turning Out: Experimental Evidence from Liberia
How to cite
Bowles, Jeremy; Larreguy, Horacio. 2017. "Turning Up, Tuning In, Turning Out: Experimental Evidence from Liberia." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002553. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2553-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Understanding the role of information is at the core of democratic accountability and the the often-broken representative-constituent link. Representatives face strong incentives to reduce the dissemination of information about their policy promises to avoid tying their hands, and to avoid being held accountable for failing to meet them, especially so when the private returns to public office are high. When the media sector is underdeveloped then this results in a low-quality, low-information equilibrium where democratic accountability suffers. We evaluate the impact of an initiative designed to simultaneously shock the supply of programmatic information by candidates and the credibility of the media sector. We do this by leveraging experimental evidence from a nationwide debate initiative ahead of Liberia’s 2017 elections for House of Representatives designed to solicit concrete policy promises from candidates. With random variation in the participation of political candidates and the intensity of debate broadcasting through community radio stations, we aim to parse how variation in exposure to the policy platforms of candidates affects levels of political information, voting behavior, electoral returns, and the role of the media in intermediating these effects. Ultimately, we want to assess whether the intervention was successful at breaking this low-quality, low-information equilibrium.
Intervention
We randomize several elements of an initiative to hold debates between all 984 candidates for 73 House of Representatives seats ahead of the Liberian election in October 2017. 129 standardized debates across all districts were designed to solicit the policy promises of different candidates in a setting where votes are most often won through purchase. In partnership with Internews Liberia and USAID, we cross-randomize two elements of the debates initiative at the between-district level, beyond the within-district sources of quasi-random variation discussed in the PAP (the splitting of candidates across debates, size of debates, and ordering of candidates within a debate). First, we generate random variation in the attendance of political candidates across debates by varying whether debates are assigned a to receive more intensive effort in persuading political candidates to attend. Second, we generate random variation in the share of a given district which is likely to hear the debates at least once by varying the intensity of debate rebroadcasting. The interventions were designed to build off parts of the debates initiative without depriving candidates or voters from opportunities they would have received absent an evaluation of the intervention: rather than experimentally varying the extensive margin of exposure, both interventions were designed to ramp up the intensity of activities already planned to facilitate their evaluation.
Experimental design
First, we randomize the encouragement to participate in the debates by varying the intensity of efforts to attract candidates to attend the debates. These debates, as discussed, were explicitly designed to solicit the policy priorities of different candidates for office. The decision to participate in a candidate debate is clearly a strategic one, and particularly so in clientelistic settings. Candidates who ‘win’ a debate may enjoy greater publicity and net electoral gains, but they risk either losing a debate or restricting their ability to deviate from policy promises on the campaign trail or once in office. Providing policy platforms through broadly-disseminated debates represents a shift from locally-disseminated cheap talk by candidates – promising to build schools, hospitals and roads everywhere – to a more costly signal of policy promises. Especially for leading candidates, the expected returns from debate participation are limited – they risk providing a platform for their challengers to attack them and gain publicity. Second, we randomize the intensity of radio coverage of the debates. Each debate is broadcast live by a community radio station, and in treatment districts debates are intensively rebroadcast ten times, at peak hours, at the height of the campaigning season. Across 43 community radio stations, easily the dominant way to acquire political information in Liberia, we thus generate variation in the share of individuals exposed to candidate promises. Aside from affecting citizen information about participating candidates, this randomization also specifically affects the relative share of radio news focusing on programmatic policy in a context where candidates frequently turn radio stations into their own mouthpieces. As such, we consider that it may also affect perceptions of media bias and credibility.
Design details
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