Do minorities hide their ethnicity to avoid being discriminated? Experimental evidence from Georgia

How to cite

Kudashvili, Nikoloz. 2017. "Do minorities hide their ethnicity to avoid being discriminated? Experimental evidence from Georgia." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002522. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2522-2.0

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Nikoloz Kudashvili*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0002522
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2522-2.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2017-10-16 – 2017-12-31
Countries
Georgia (Tbilisi)
JEL codes
C91, C93 D04
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2522

Abstract

The prevalence of discrimination against minorities is well documented in the econom-ics literature. But how do minorities react to the threat of discrimination? In this project, we investigate whether minorities misrepresent their ethnicity to avoid being discriminated and how such behavior affects efficiency. We run a modified version of trust game on discrimination in the country of Georgia. In Georgia, first names serve as unambiguous identifiers for ethnic affiliation (Georgian or Armenian). We implement four between-subject treatments: In treatment G-G, a Georgian first-mover (trustor) plays the trust game with a Georgian second-mover (trustee). In G-A, the first-mover is Georgian and the second-mover is Armenian. Following Fershtman and Gneezy (2001), ethnicity is revealed through first names in the two treatments. Comparing first-mover behavior between G-G and G-A yields the basic level of discrimination in the society. In the third treatment, G-A_signal, we implement a signaling stage before the first-mover takes her decision. In the signaling stage, the Armenian second-mover has the option to signal her ethnic affiliation to the Georgian first-mover. Comparing first-mover behavior between G-A_signal and G-A shows whether the signaling stage increases efficiency by mitigating discrimination. Finally, in the fourth treatment, A-A_signal, first- and second movers are Armenians. Comparing second movers’ signaling behavior between G-A_signal and A-A_signal informs us about the extent to which second movers’ signal choice is strategic.

Experimental design

We conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment with four treatments: “G-G”, “G-A”, “G-A_signal”, “A-A_signal”.

Randomization Method:
- Assigning participants to different treatments by blindly drawing a numbered card out of a bag of several cards.
- Georgian Schools: Randomization between G-G (first- and second-mover), G-A (first-mover), G-A_signal (first mover). Armenian schools: Randomization be-tween G-A (second-mover), G-A_signal (second-mover), A-A_signal (first- and second mover).

Design details

Randomization method
Numbered Cards drawn from non-transparent bag
Randomization unit
individual
Clusters
700 (350 Georgian participants; 350 Armenian participants)
Observations
700
Arms
There will be four treatments. G-G: 160 observations (80 first-movers, 80 second-movers) G-A: 160 observations (80 first-movers, 80 second-movers) G-A_signal: 220 observations (110 first-movers, 110 second-movers) A-A_signal: 160 observations (80 first-movers, 80 second-movers)
Primary outcomes
1. Overall efficiency: That is the number of total tokens “produced” in the game (number of tokens sent by first mover times three). 2. Signaling behavior: The message chosen second movers in “G-A_signal” and “A-A_signal”.
Secondary outcomes
First- and second-mover’s beliefs about each other’s behavior.

Cited by

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Keywords