The Impact of Medicare Bundled Payments: Evidence from a Nationwide Randomized Evaluation for Lower Extremity Joint Replacement

How to cite

Finkelstein, Amy; Mahoney, Neale; Skinner, Jonathan; Ji, Yunan. 2017. "The Impact of Medicare Bundled Payments: Evidence from a Nationwide Randomized Evaluation for Lower Extremity Joint Replacement." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002521. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2521-2.1

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Amy Finkelstein* , Neale Mahoney , Jonathan Skinner , Yunan Ji

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0002521
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2521-2.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2016-04-01 – 2020-12-31
Countries
United States of America ()
JEL codes
I13; I18; H51
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2521

Abstract

Bundled payments (BP) are a key part of Medicare’s shift away from the traditional fee-for-service (FFS) payment model. We propose to study a nationwide randomized-controlled trial (RCT) of bundled payments for knee and hip replacements that was designed by CMS and launched in April 2016. Randomization was conducted at the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level with 67 MSAs and about 800 hospitals assigned to the treatment group. We will examine the impact of bundled payments on Medicare spending, utilization, and quality. Our findings should be directly relevant for the design of payments for knee and hip replacements, two common and expensive medical procedures. Average impacts, as well as variation in impact across types of providers and markets may also shed light on economic mechanisms, which should be relevant for bundled payment initiatives under consideration for other medical services.

Intervention

Bundled payments (BP) are a key part of Medicare’s shift away from the traditional fee-for-service (FFS) payment model. We propose to study a nationwide randomized-controlled trial (RCT) of bundled payments for knee and hip replacements that was designed and implemented by CMS and launched in April 2016.
This bundled payment model for lower-extremity joint replacement holds acute care hospitals (ACHs) financially responsible for the spending and quality of an entire episode of care. It targets two types of hospital admissions: major joint replacement or reattachment of lower extremity with and without major complications or comorbidities (MS-DRG 469 and 470). An episode begins with an ACH stay that results in a discharge in one of the two included DRGs, and ends 90 days after ACH discharge. Before each performance year begins, hospitals receive their target prices from CMS, determined by historical hospital and regional episode expenditures and a 3% discount factor to reflect Medicare’s portion of savings from CJR. Hospitals are eligible for reconciliation payment from CMS if they spend less than the target prices for an episode, provided that they met an “acceptable” quality standard. Conversely, they are responsible for paying the difference if they spend more than the target prices.

Experimental design

We propose to study a randomized-controlled trial (RCT) of bundled payments for knee and hip replacement called Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement (CJR). The RCT was designed by CMS, launched in April 2016, and is expected to last 5 years. Randomization was conducted at the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level, with 67 MSAs and about 800 hospitals assigned to the treatment group. The CJR model is a Medicare bundled payment model for lower-extremity joint replacement (LEJR) that holds acute care hospitals (ACHs) financially responsible for the spending and quality of the entire episode of care. The CJR model targets two types of hospital admissions: major joint replacement or reattachment of lower extremity with and without major complications or comorbidities (MS-DRG 469 and 470). An episode begins with an ACH stay that results in a discharge in one of the two included DRGs, and ends 90 days after ACH discharge.

In July 2015, CMS publicly announced its exclusion criteria for eligible MSAs in its proposed rule, and posted the list of 196 eligible MSAs on the CJR website. The exclusion criteria were designed to limit the sample to MSAs with a reasonable volume in the LEJR DRGs and to exclude MSAs with a high take-up of BPCI. CMS also published the randomization procedure (including strata and treatment probabilities within strata), and the resulting 75 treatment MSAs (80 Federal Register 134, 2015). We have verified that we can replicate CMS’s randomization procedure.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization was done by the federal government.
Randomization unit
CMS conducted randomization at the MSA level
Clusters
196 MSAs
Observations
196 eligible MSAs x number of LEJR episodes
Arms
75 MSAs assigned to treatment group, 121 control
Primary outcomes
Share of LEJR admissions discharged to institutional Post Acute Care (PAC)
Secondary outcomes
1. Share of LEJR admissions discharged to any Post Acute Care (PAC) 2. Number of days in Institutional PAC during episode 3. Total covered Medicare payments during episode 4. Total covered Medicare payments for Institutional PAC during episode 5. Total covered Medicare payments for any PAC during episode 6. Total beneficiary payments owed out of pocket during episode

Materials

Papers from this trial

  1. Finkelstein A, Ji Y, Mahoney N, Skinner J. Mandatory Medicare Bundled Payment Program for Lower Extremity Joint Replacement and Discharge to Institutional Postacute Care: Interim Analysis of the First Year of a 5-Year Randomized Trial. JAMA. 2018;320(9):892–900. doi:10.1001/jama.2018.12346 https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2698927
  2. Einav L, Finkelstein A, Ji Y, Mahoney N. Randomized trial shows healthcare payment reform has equal-sized spillover effects on patients not targeted by reform. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2020 Aug 11;117(32):18939-18947. doi: 10.1073/pnas.2004759117. Epub 2020 Jul 27 https://www.pnas.org/doi/abs/10.1073/pnas.2004759117
  3. Einav L, Finkelstein A, Ji Y, Mahoney N. VOLUNTARY REGULATION: EVIDENCE FROM MEDICARE PAYMENT REFORM. Q J Econ. 2022 Feb;137(1):565-618. doi: 10.1093/qje/qjab035. Epub 2021 Sep 20. PMID: 35233120; PMCID: PMC8884469. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8884469/

Cited by

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Keywords