Effects of Emigration on Rural Labor Markets

How to cite

Mobarak, Ahmed; Chowdhury, Shyamal; Akram, Agha Ali. 2017. "Effects of Emigration on Rural Labor Markets." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002507. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2507-1.0

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Ahmed Mobarak* , Shyamal Chowdhury , Agha Ali Akram

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0002507
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2507-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2014-11-01 – 2016-08-15
Countries
Bangladesh (Northwest (Rangpur))
JEL codes
O1
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2507

Abstract

Rural to urban migration is an integral part of the development process, but there is little evidence on how out-migration transforms rural labor markets. Emigration could benefit landless village residents by reducing labor competition, or conversely, reduce productivity if skilled workers leave. To study this, we offer to subsidize transport costs for 5,792 potential seasonal migrants in Bangladesh, randomly varying saturation of offers across 133 villages. The transport subsidies increase beneficiaries’ income due to better employment opportunities in the city, and also generate the following spillovers: (a) A higher density of offers increases the individual take-up rate, and induces those connected to offered recipients to also migrate. (b) This increases the male agricultural wage rate in the village, and the available work hours in the village, which combine to increase income earned in the village, (c) There is no intra-household substitution in labor supply, but primary workers within households earn more during weeks in which many of their village co-residents moved away. (d) The wage bill for agricultural employers increases, which reduces their profit, with no significant change in yield. (e) Food prices increase driven by an increase in the price of (fish) protein, and offset by (f) a decrease in the price of non-tradables like prepared food and tea. Seasonal migration subsidies not only generate large direct benefits, but also indirect spillover benefits by creating slack in the village-of-origin labor market during the lean season.

Intervention

The form of our intervention was the offer of a cash grant worth 1,000 taka (13 USD) to rural households in northern Bangladesh to cover the round-trip cost of travel to nearby cities where there are job opportunities during the lean season. This was a conditional transfer, where the subsidy is conditional on one person from the household agreeing to out-migrate during the lean season. As offers were made, we let households know that they may have a better chance of finding work outside of their village, but we did not offer to make any connections to employers. No requirement was imposed on who within the household had to migrate, or what city they had to go to. Migration was carefully and strictly monitored by project staff to ensure adherence to the conditionality.

We first conducted village censuses to identify all households that would be “eligible” to receive this intervention in each of these villages. A household was deemed eligible if (1) it owned less than 0.5 acres of land, and (2) it reported back in 2008 that a member had experienced hunger (i.e., skipped meals) during the 2007 lean season.

We varied the number of eligible households in a village that received a travel grant offer. We randomly assigned 133 villages into three groups:
(a) Low Intensity – 48 villages where we targeted migration subsidies to roughly 14% of the eligible (landless, poor) population.
(b) High Intensity – 47 villages where we targeted roughly 70% of the eligible population with migration subsidy offers.
(c) Control – 38 randomly selected villages where nobody was offered a migration subsidy.

Within each village, eligible households were randomly selected to receive the travel grant offer.

Experimental design

We varied the number of eligible households in a village that received a travel grant offer. We randomly assigned 133 villages into three groups:
(a) Low Intensity – 48 villages where we targeted migration subsidies to roughly 14% of the eligible (landless, poor) population.
(b) High Intensity – 47 villages where we targeted roughly 70% of the eligible population with migration subsidy offers.
(c) Control – 38 randomly selected villages where nobody was offered a migration subsidy.

The high vs. low intensity design was chosen to generate significant variation in the size of the emigration shock.

This experimental variation enabled the PIs to estimate the impact the grant offers had on the probability of migration and labor market participation, including for households not offered the grant (spillover households). The design also allowed PIs to estimate the impact of out-migration on village economies including impacts on local wages, employers and food prices.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in office by a computer.
Randomization unit
Village.
Clusters
133 villages.
Observations
Endline survey: 3,602 households; Employer survey: 1,099 employers (year-1) and 649 (year-2); Shopkeeper survey: 399.
Arms
(a) Low Intensity – 48 villages; 883 households offered grant. (b) High Intensity – 47 villages; 4,881 households offered grant. (c) Control – 38 villages; zero households offered grant.
Primary outcomes
- Individual propensity to migrate - Individual income earned - Village wage rate - Employer profit - Shopkeeper food prices
Secondary outcomes
Wage Rate in the village Food prices in the village

Papers from this trial

  1. http://faculty.som.yale.edu/mushfiqmobarak/papers/MigrationGE.pdf

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Keywords