On the mechanics of the political resource curse: information and local elite behaviour in Mozambique

How to cite

Armand, Alex; Vicente, Pedro; Coutts, Alexander; Vilela, Inês. 2017. "On the mechanics of the political resource curse: information and local elite behaviour in Mozambique." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002493. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2493-3.0

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Alex Armand* , Pedro Vicente , Alexander Coutts , Inês Vilela

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0002493
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2493-3.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2016-07-01 – 2018-12-31
Countries
Mozambique (Cabo Delgado)
JEL codes
D72, O13, O55, P16.
Secondary IDs
TW8R2/1008
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2493

Abstract

Mozambique discovered substantial natural resources in recent years. Known gas reserves in the Rovuma basin have the potential to transform Mozambique into a global player in Liquefied Natural Gas exports. Being a recent democracy, and with relatively weak institutions, Mozambique also faces considerable risks of resource and revenue mismanagement in the future, particularly since media independence and penetration are low and the level of political accountability is not improving. This RCT aims at understanding the effect of the distribution of information about the newly discovered natural gas in the Rovuma basin (Cabo Delgado Province) and about natural resources in general, and the effect of holding of citizen meetings to deliberate on the main priorities for spending the revenues from these resources, on the behaviour of villagers living in the Province.

Intervention

The intervention we are evaluating consists on a large information and deliberation campaign about the discovery of natural resources in the Province of Cabo Delgado, focusing on the recent natural gas discoveries. In collaboration with our partners, we randomly allocated 200 communities to one of the following groups:
A. Control Group
B. Information provided to the Local Elite
C. Information provided to the Local Elite and the Citizens
D. Information provided to the Local Elite and the Citizens plus Deliberation

In the group D), the participants to the deliberation activity are divided into groups and each group is randomly allocated to one of the following voting procedure: raising hands; secret vote; no restrictions imposed on voting.

Experimental design

This study involves measuring outcomes at both the community and individual levels. Community-level outcomes are part of a single or one-level experimental design. Individual-level outcomes involve clustering at the community level and are considered through a two-level design.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in office by a computer.
Randomization unit
Randomization is at polling station level.
Clusters
200 polling stations
Observations
2000 individuals + 200 village leaders
Arms
50 polling stations
Primary outcomes
Aspirations, Demand for political accountability, Information, Social capital, Trust, Attitudes towards Public Goods, Attitudes towards Rent-Seeking, Attitudes towards Corruption, Engagement with Local Leaders.
Secondary outcomes
Consumption, Ownership of durable goods, Income and Assets, Political participation: turn-out and vote, Quality of deliberation process.

Materials

Papers from this trial

  1. Armand, Alex, Alexander Coutts, Pedro C. Vicente, and Inês Vilela. 2020. "Does Information Break the Political Resource Curse? Experimental Evidence from Mozambique." American Economic Review, 110 (11): 3431-53. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20190842

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Keywords