On the mechanics of the political resource curse: information and local elite behaviour in Mozambique
How to cite
Armand, Alex; Vicente, Pedro; Coutts, Alexander; Vilela, Inês. 2017. "On the mechanics of the political resource curse: information and local elite behaviour in Mozambique." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002493. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2493-3.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Mozambique discovered substantial natural resources in recent years. Known gas reserves in the Rovuma basin have the potential to transform Mozambique into a global player in Liquefied Natural Gas exports. Being a recent democracy, and with relatively weak institutions, Mozambique also faces considerable risks of resource and revenue mismanagement in the future, particularly since media independence and penetration are low and the level of political accountability is not improving. This RCT aims at understanding the effect of the distribution of information about the newly discovered natural gas in the Rovuma basin (Cabo Delgado Province) and about natural resources in general, and the effect of holding of citizen meetings to deliberate on the main priorities for spending the revenues from these resources, on the behaviour of villagers living in the Province.
Intervention
The intervention we are evaluating consists on a large information and deliberation campaign about the discovery of natural resources in the Province of Cabo Delgado, focusing on the recent natural gas discoveries. In collaboration with our partners, we randomly allocated 200 communities to one of the following groups:
A. Control Group
B. Information provided to the Local Elite
C. Information provided to the Local Elite and the Citizens
D. Information provided to the Local Elite and the Citizens plus Deliberation
In the group D), the participants to the deliberation activity are divided into groups and each group is randomly allocated to one of the following voting procedure: raising hands; secret vote; no restrictions imposed on voting.
Experimental design
This study involves measuring outcomes at both the community and individual levels. Community-level outcomes are part of a single or one-level experimental design. Individual-level outcomes involve clustering at the community level and are considered through a two-level design.
Design details
Materials
Papers from this trial
- Armand, Alex, Alexander Coutts, Pedro C. Vicente, and Inês Vilela. 2020. "Does Information Break the Political Resource Curse? Experimental Evidence from Mozambique." American Economic Review, 110 (11): 3431-53. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20190842
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