Optimizing Payment Formulas for Results-Based Financing: Evidence from a Survey and a Lab-in-the-Field Experiment in Nigeria
How to cite
Bauhoff, Sebastian; Kandpal, Eeshani. 2017. "Optimizing Payment Formulas for Results-Based Financing: Evidence from a Survey and a Lab-in-the-Field Experiment in Nigeria." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002482. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2482-3.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Results-based financing (RBF) programs for health in low and middle-income countries often offer financial incentives to health care providers or workers to increase the quantity of a selected set of health care services and/or quality measures. PBF programs can induce behavioral responses in several ways, e.g., by communicating what services are considered “priority” and/or by the financial incentives attached to the included measures.
We survey health workers in Nigeria to examine whether they know about and understand an ongoing RBF program. We use an incentivized experiment to examine health workers’ response to the information and the financial incentives (rewards or penalties) implicit in RBF programs. Specifically, health workers are asked to read several partograph cases and to determine the correct actions to be taken based on this information. Within a clinic, we randomize workers into three study arms: (a) information-only; (b) information with rewards for specific activities; and (c) information with penalties for not doing specific activities. We compare health worker performance in each of these three study arms. We also examine whether performance is better for items that are included in the list, carry any financial incentive, and the value of the reward or penalty.
Intervention
In this study, health workers are asked to each read five partograph cases and to identify the correct action(s) to be taken based on this information. Individuals are randomized into three study arms: (a) information-only; (b) information with rewards for specific activities; and (c) information with penalties for not doing specific activities. Participants in all study arms are shown a printed list of tasks. Only the lists for the rewards/penalty arms have a monetary value attached to some (but not all) tasks on this list.
All participants are paid in mobile phone airtime. The rewards and penalty groups receive a base payment to which we add or subtract based on their performance.
Experimental design
The experiment will be conducted with health workers who are already being interviewed in primary and secondary care facilities in Nigeria as part of the impact evaluation of a performance-based financing (PBF) project. The larger PBF project has assigned three conditions at the state-level: performance-based financing, decentralized facility financing and a control condition.
The information provided to participants has several features. First, not all “correct” tasks are included on the list. Second, even in the reward/penalty arms, some tasks are not incentivized. Third, the value of the reward/penalty varies across incentivized tasks.
We will conduct two sets of analyses:
1. Comparing the effects of providing information, rewards and penalties. We will compare the outcomes under the three study arms. This analysis will be done the level of the health worker, accounting for clinic-specific effects and clustering at the clinic level.
2. Comparing the effect of (a) whether the task is included in the list given the participants (binary); (b) whether the task has a positive reward/penalty (binary); (c) the level of the reward/penalty (continuous). This analysis will be done at the level of each task included on the list, accounting for worker-specific effects and clustering at the worker level.
The primary analyses will not include additional covariates for the clinics and/or workers. In secondary analyses, we will include selected covariates at the clinic and worker levels that are described below.
In additional secondary analyses, we will examine interactions with indicator variables for the larger projects’ interventions (PBF, decentralized facility financing, control). For observations within the PBF states, we will also conduct secondary analyses comparing those who exhibited knowledge of the PBF program versus those who did not.
Design details
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