The Endowment Effect and the Take-up of Collateralized Loans

How to cite

Rao, Gautam; Kremer, Michael. 2017. "The Endowment Effect and the Take-up of Collateralized Loans." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002448. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2448-1.0

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Gautam Rao* , Michael Kremer

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0002448
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2448-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2017-09-25 – 2018-09-25
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2448

Abstract

Loans to purchase new assets sometimes use the new assets themselves as collateral, as in car or home loans in the developed world. Other loans—especially in developing countries —instead require using existing assets as collateral. We hypothesize that the endowment effect (Kahneman et al. 1990) causes consumers to dislike placing existing assets at risk by promising them as collateral. This might drive down take-up of loans collateralized using existing assets, relative to collateralizing with new assets (which may not yet have entered the reference point). The proposed project will test this mechanism using a randomized experiment in Kenya. A secondary goal will be to test whether borrowers anticipate that new assets might themselves eventually enter the reference point, becoming subject to an endowment effect. Our findings will shed light on psychological factors affecting demand for financing, and on the welfare implications of loans collateralized using new assets.

Intervention

We endow households with one randomly-selected household or agricultural durable good, and offer them a loan to purchase a second randomly-selected good. We elicit willingness to pay for two types of loans to purchase the second good: standard asset-collateralized loans (SACLs) and new asset-collateralized loans (NACLs). SACLs require borrowers to use existing assets as collateral, while NACLs use the very item being purchased as collateral. These loans are administered by a well-established Kenyan Savings and Credit Cooperative Organization (SACCO).

Experimental design

We will endow each respondent with an item for free, and later elicit their willingness to pay for new items using a loan, experimentally varying whether the previously endowed item or the new item being purchase is used as collateral. We will elicit predictions of future willingness to pay for these loans, to determine whether respondents anticipate their loan preferences prior to being endowed with any item.

Design details

Randomization method
The randomization of goods is conducted in SurveyCTO using randomly generated numbers. Randomization of prices in BDM procedure done by a draw of lots by the participant themselves
Randomization unit
Individual-good level
Clusters
700 individuals
Observations
700 individuals
Arms
We do not have treatment "arms" as such, since each of the 700 individuals will have one good randomized to their endowment, one good offered for sale, and will reveal their willingness to pay for two loan types.
Primary outcomes
Primary outcome: Willingness to pay for the loans. Secondary outcomes: Willingness to pay for household and agricultural items without a loan Predicted future willingness to pay for these items using loans Perceived risk of loan default Willingness to accept for previously endowed items Predicted future willingness to accept for items to be endowed Acceptance or rejection of small-scale, gain-loss lotteries (to measure loss aversion).

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Keywords