Media and Motivation: The effect of performance pay on writers and content

How to cite

Tjernstrom, Emilia; Balbuzanov, Ivan; Gars, Jared. 2017. "Media and Motivation: The effect of performance pay on writers and content." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002396. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2396-3.0

Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.

Emilia Tjernstrom* , Ivan Balbuzanov , Jared Gars

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0002396
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2396-3.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2017-09-05 – 2018-08-05
Countries
Private
JEL codes
L82, J22, J33, D83
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2396

Abstract

Performance contracts have been implemented in a variety of settings, yet there is mixed empirical evidence on whether performance pay actually matters for overall firm profits. Despite a recent shift towards performance-based contracts for online journalists, and oft-cited concerns about the impacts of this business model on the quality of journalism, no studies to date investigate the relationship between performance contracts and firm profits or journalistic quality in the market for news. In this project, we use a natural field experiment to study the impacts of pay-per-click contracts for journalists on writer
performance, firm profits, and journalistic quality in an online news firm. We seek to provide evidence on the tradeoffs between the strength of incentives and the effectiveness of contracting on outputs in a context where agents have (or can gain) specific knowledge about the returns to various actions. Our research design focuses on two main contributions: First, by combining random allocation to contract type with individual-level productivity beliefs, we can test whether stronger incentives increase the acquisition and use of information about marginal returns to writer effort. Second, by classifying article-level political and ethnic bias, we will study the effects of contract type on media bias, in an attempt to gain insights into the importance of supply- and demand-side sources of media bias.

Intervention

The study will be conducted using within-firm data from a digital news platform. The website is an online newspaper that sources all its news stories from local reporters who are currently paid a fixed rate via mobile-money for each article they publish. The project aims to examine the effects of different types of incentives for writers on the quality and quantity of their output. We will randomize writers into three different types of contracts:
1) Control group: The control group contracts will remain the same. The current reward structure is a fixed fee of W per article that is published.
2) Treatment group A / Pay-per-view: This contract will reward writers with a fee structure composed by a smaller fixed fee, and a bonus for every click that the article receives. The variable fee is calibrated using the prior month’s views, such that the ex ante expected value returns for writers equal to the status quo.
3) Treatment group B / Contract choice: The third group will be allowed to select at the beginning of the treatment period whether they would like to stay with the pay-per-article contract (status quo), or if they would like to switch to a pay-per-view system. If they choose the pay-per-view contract, the contract will be identical to Treatment group A.

Experimental design

The study will be conducted using within-firm data from a digital news platform. The website is an online newspaper that sources all its news stories from local reporters who are currently paid a fixed rate via mobile-money for each article they publish. The project aims to examine the effects of different types of incentives for writers on the quality and quantity of their output.

We will randomize writers into three different types of contracts:
1) Control group: The control group contracts will remain the same. The current reward structure is a fixed fee of W per article that is published.
2) Treatment group A / Pay-per-view: This contract will reward writers with a fee structure composed by a smaller fixed fee, and a bonus for every click that the article receives. The variable fee is calibrated using the prior month’s views, such that the ex ante expected value returns for writers equal to the status quo.
3) Treatment group B / Contract choice: The third group will be allowed to select at the beginning of the treatment period whether they would like to stay with the pay-per-article contract (status quo), or if they would like to switch to a pay-per-view system. If they choose the pay-per-view contract, the contract will be identical to Treatment group A.

Design details

Randomization method
Stratified randomization (stratifying on average pageviews, whether or not the writer has published in the 6 weeks, and the number of articles published per week; 8 total strata). If new writers sign up after the launch of the experiment, they will be randomized into a one of the two treatment arms or into control based on simple randomization.
Randomization unit
Individual writer-level randomization
Clusters
200 individual writers
Observations
200 individual writers
Arms
Roughly 67 writers per treatment arm. If new writers sign up after the launch of the experiment, they will be randomized into a one of the two treatment arms or into control based on simple randomization.
Primary outcomes
1) Number of articles submitted, 2) Views/week, 3) Social media sharing (as an alternative measure of 'quality', 4) Writer earnings, 5) Article topic choice, 6) Article and writer bias (political and ethnic), 7) Prediction error, 8) Contract choice and 9) Writer effort

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords