Innovative financial products for the poor – Experimental evidence from the Philippines

How to cite

Czura, Kristina; John, Anett; Spantig, Lisa. 2017. "Innovative financial products for the poor – Experimental evidence from the Philippines." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002355. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2355-5.199999999999999

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Kristina Czura* , Anett John , Lisa Spantig

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0002355
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2355-5.199999999999999
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2016-03-14 – 2020-12-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2355

Abstract

Joint-liability groups and rigid repayment schedules have long been considered essential for guaranteeing high repayment rates in microcredit lending, since they offer mutual insurance and keep repayment discipline high. Yet both features have been criticized lately: rigid repayment schedules interfere with fluctuating incomes, and joint liability induces excessive peer pressure, as group members internalize the mission indoctrination of the microlender. Anecdotal evidence suggests that members who miss one installment due to a shock often do not dare to return to the group at all. We study whether the interaction of both flexible repayment features and joint-liability allows reaping the benefits of joint liability and flexibility - high repayment and shock coping capacity - while keeping their downsides - low repayment morale and excessive peer pressure - at bay. To this end, we conduct lab-in-the-field experiments with microcredit borrowers in the Philippines, where we systematically vary the liability structure and flexible repayment features. Outcome measures include repayment behaviour as well as a novel, behavioural measure of peer pressure and anti-social punishment.

Intervention

In lab-in-the-field experiments, we exogenously vary 1) the liability structure: joint liability vs. individual liability, and 2) the provision of repayment flexibility.

Experimental design

We use a microfinance repayment game in a lab-in-the-field setting to analyze the enforcement problem (ex-post moral hazard) under risk. We exogenously vary the liability structure and the availability of flexibility in a 2 × 2 design: individual vs joint liability and flexibility vs no flexibility.

Design details

Randomization method
Done in office by computer
Randomization unit
Randomization at borrowing center level
Clusters
Clustered by borrowing center, 33 clusters planned
Observations
650 borrowers
Arms
17 clusters in treatment 1 16 clusters in treatment 2
Primary outcomes
o Use of flexibility o Repayment and default o Peer punishment

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords