Innovative financial products for the poor – Experimental evidence from the Philippines
How to cite
Czura, Kristina; John, Anett; Spantig, Lisa. 2017. "Innovative financial products for the poor – Experimental evidence from the Philippines." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002355. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2355-5.199999999999999
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Joint-liability groups and rigid repayment schedules have long been considered essential for guaranteeing high repayment rates in microcredit lending, since they offer mutual insurance and keep repayment discipline high. Yet both features have been criticized lately: rigid repayment schedules interfere with fluctuating incomes, and joint liability induces excessive peer pressure, as group members internalize the mission indoctrination of the microlender. Anecdotal evidence suggests that members who miss one installment due to a shock often do not dare to return to the group at all. We study whether the interaction of both flexible repayment features and joint-liability allows reaping the benefits of joint liability and flexibility - high repayment and shock coping capacity - while keeping their downsides - low repayment morale and excessive peer pressure - at bay. To this end, we conduct lab-in-the-field experiments with microcredit borrowers in the Philippines, where we systematically vary the liability structure and flexible repayment features. Outcome measures include repayment behaviour as well as a novel, behavioural measure of peer pressure and anti-social punishment.
Intervention
In lab-in-the-field experiments, we exogenously vary 1) the liability structure: joint liability vs. individual liability, and 2) the provision of repayment flexibility.
Experimental design
We use a microfinance repayment game in a lab-in-the-field setting to analyze the enforcement problem (ex-post moral hazard) under risk. We exogenously vary the liability structure and the availability of flexibility in a 2 × 2 design: individual vs joint liability and flexibility vs no flexibility.
Design details
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