The effects of information sharing on moral hazard in credit markets - Evidence from a randomized evaluation in the Philippines

How to cite

Czura, Kristina; Fahn, Matthias; Spantig, Lisa. 2017. "The effects of information sharing on moral hazard in credit markets - Evidence from a randomized evaluation in the Philippines." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002346. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2346-7.0

Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.

Kristina Czura* , Matthias Fahn , Lisa Spantig

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0002346
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2346-7.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2016-03-09 – 2024-12-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2346

Abstract

The increasing popularity of microfinance resulted in fierce competition in credit markets in many developing counties. Despite the favorable notion of competition in general, increased competition has led to new challenges. Recent studies find that higher levels of competition among microfinance institutions (MFIs) are related to over-indebtedness of borrowers and weakened loan repayment incentives. This might partly be driven by the absence of information sharing between lenders and the increase in competition which in turn results in greater information asymmetries in the markets. Information sharing via credit registries can thus be an important measure to improve the performance of microcredit markets and better access to credit for the poor. In this project we seek to answer the question how information sharing affects moral hazard in the credit market. We design and implement an information campaign regarding a private credit registry used by several microfinance institutions to increase knowledge on the existence of the credit registry among borrowers.

Intervention

We design an information campaign to increase knowledge about a private credit registry that shares information on borrowers among microfinance institutions in the Philippines. The information campaign is conducted in lending centers of a partner microfinance institution that offers group loans in lending centers of 5 to 40 borrowers. The intervention is randomly assigned at the center level.

Experimental design

We first elicit baseline values of variables of interest in a random subset of our study population via an individual survey. We then administer the above described intervention (i.e. information campaigns) in randomly selected centers. Shortly after the intervention, we re-survey the same individuals in the midline and approximately one year after the intervention, we administer the endline survey.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in office by a computer
Randomization unit
Borrowing centers consisting of 1-8 borrowing groups with 5 borrowers each
Clusters
Number of borrowing centers included in study: 303 o Treatment 1: Standard campaign: 72 o Treatment 2: Detailed campaign: 75 o Treatment 3: Control campaign: 31 o Control: 125
Observations
We have two data sources: 1) Household phone survey with randomly selected clients from the participating centers. The planned number of borrowers being interviewed is 2000. Actual number of surveyed borrowers: in Baseline: 1941 in Midline: 1898 in Endline: currently ongoing 2) Administrative data on all clients in 303 participating centers from 2012 to 2017
Arms
Treatment randomly assigned to borrowing centers with the following number of centers in each treatment o Treatment 1: Standard campaign: 72 o Treatment 2: Detailed campaign: 75 o Treatment 3: Control campaign: 31 o Control: 125
Primary outcomes
Effort provision (in work/ household business), Repayment, Monitoring, Peer pressure, Usage of alternative credit sources, Investments

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords