The effects of information sharing on moral hazard in credit markets - Evidence from a randomized evaluation in the Philippines
How to cite
Czura, Kristina; Fahn, Matthias; Spantig, Lisa. 2017. "The effects of information sharing on moral hazard in credit markets - Evidence from a randomized evaluation in the Philippines." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002346. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2346-7.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
The increasing popularity of microfinance resulted in fierce competition in credit markets in many developing counties. Despite the favorable notion of competition in general, increased competition has led to new challenges. Recent studies find that higher levels of competition among microfinance institutions (MFIs) are related to over-indebtedness of borrowers and weakened loan repayment incentives. This might partly be driven by the absence of information sharing between lenders and the increase in competition which in turn results in greater information asymmetries in the markets. Information sharing via credit registries can thus be an important measure to improve the performance of microcredit markets and better access to credit for the poor. In this project we seek to answer the question how information sharing affects moral hazard in the credit market. We design and implement an information campaign regarding a private credit registry used by several microfinance institutions to increase knowledge on the existence of the credit registry among borrowers.
Intervention
We design an information campaign to increase knowledge about a private credit registry that shares information on borrowers among microfinance institutions in the Philippines. The information campaign is conducted in lending centers of a partner microfinance institution that offers group loans in lending centers of 5 to 40 borrowers. The intervention is randomly assigned at the center level.
Experimental design
We first elicit baseline values of variables of interest in a random subset of our study population via an individual survey. We then administer the above described intervention (i.e. information campaigns) in randomly selected centers. Shortly after the intervention, we re-survey the same individuals in the midline and approximately one year after the intervention, we administer the endline survey.
Design details
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