Learning accountability: Can formal education help hold politicians to account?

How to cite

Marshall, John; Larreguy, Horacio; Bhandari, Abhit. 2017. "Learning accountability: Can formal education help hold politicians to account?." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002324. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2324-3.1

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John Marshall* , Horacio Larreguy , Abhit Bhandari

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0002324
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2324-3.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2017-07-04 – 2017-12-31
Countries
Senegal ()
JEL codes
D72, I25
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2324

Abstract

Effective democratic representation is closely connected to economic development, good governance, and political stability. However, accountability is often limited in the developing contexts where it is needed most. In light of the mixed evidence that information dissemination campaigns can support electoral accountability, we explore whether education complements or substitutes for information provision in pursuing this goal. To assess these claims, we are conducting a panel survey in Senegal around the July 2017 national legislative elections. Our design nests two sources of exogenous variation: quasi-experimental variation in access to free secondary schooling and randomized individual-level provision of legislator duty and performance information before the election. Such variation enables us to plausibly identify the effects of access to secondary education, information about deputy responsibilities, incumbent and benchmarked performance information, and their interactions on political engagement and electoral accountability. The surveys also explore the mechanisms underpinning these effects, helping us to speak to the broader question of whether and how education complements or substitutes for information provision in supporting electoral accountability, and ultimately democratic representation.

Experimental design

To identify the interaction between education and information provision we combine natural variation with a randomized controlled trial. First, we leverage variation in school construction to identify the effects of access to education using a difference-in-differences (and instrumental variables) design that compares cohorts just too old to be affected by the reforms to cohorts affected by the reforms in villages that were and were not close to locations where new secondary schools were constructed. Second, we randomize the provision of incumbent performance information to individuals in those cohorts and villages. In addition, we compare the effects of just informing voters about their current incumbent with also providing a temporal benchmark---the performance of a previous incumbent. To further probe the conditions required to process and incorporate such information in voting decisions, we further vary whether voters are informed of the duties of their deputies. We conduct a panel survey to measure the pre-treatment effects of education, the effects of different types of information provision, and interaction between education and information provision on electoral accountability and several costly behavioral outcomes. A variety of treatment variants and survey questions help us to separate between the mechanisms potentially driving our main hypotheses relating to the effects of education, information provision, and their potential complementarity or substitutability on electoral accountability.

Design details

Randomization method
By computer in private.
Randomization unit
Information treatments (randomized): village. Education access (natural variation): village-cohort.
Clusters
450 villages.
Observations
Around 4050 respondents (seek 9 per village).
Arms
Information treatments (randomized): 75 control villages; 75 deputy duties information villages; 75 incumbent performance villages; 75 incumbent performance + deputy duties information villages; 75 benchmarked incumbent performance villages; 75 benchmarked incumbent performance + deputy duties information villages. Education treatment (natural variation): 225 low education reform intensity villages; 225 high education reform intensity villages. Within these villages, 1/3 of respondents will be fully affected by the reform, 1/3 partially affected by the reform; and 1/3 unaffected by the reform.
Primary outcomes
Voter beliefs about incumbent and challenger performance in office, political knowledge, comprehension of politician performance information, vote choice, costly indications of candidate support.

Materials

Papers from this trial

  1. Bhandari, Abhit, Horacio Larreguy, and John Marshall. "Able and Mostly Willing: An Empirical Anatomy of Information's Effect on Voter-Driven Accountability in Senegal." Forthcoming, American Journal of Political Science. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12591 https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ajps.12591

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Keywords