The Selection and Incentive Effects of Money and Recognition for Problem Solvers
How to cite
Zimmerling, Eric; Lakhani, Karim; Gallus, Jana. 2017. "The Selection and Incentive Effects of Money and Recognition for Problem Solvers." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002303. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2303-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This field experiment employs a two-stage design to study the selection and treatment effects of recognition benchmarked against money. The context is a large online crowdsourcing platform where knowledge workers engage in coding challenges. The incentives consist in a fixed wage and a recognition (awards) treatment, both of which are dependent on completion but not on performance.
Intervention
The treatment groups will be:
(1) a standard invitation (baseline)
(2) a $5 reward, which the platform providers and a subsample of frequent users have identified as a fair wage in the context of the algorithm competitions in question
(3) recognition in the form of an award. The award was designed to yield generalizable results.
Experimental design
This field experiment employs a two-stage randomized design that involves monetary and non-monetary treatments both as ex ante incentives and ex post rewards.
Design details
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