Repayment Flexibility: Contract Choice and Investment Decisions among Indian Microfinance Borrowers

How to cite

Gupta, Khushboo; Agarwal, Parul; Barboni, Giorgia. 2017. "Repayment Flexibility: Contract Choice and Investment Decisions among Indian Microfinance Borrowers." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002259. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2259-3.1

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Khushboo Gupta* , Parul Agarwal , Giorgia Barboni

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0002259
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2259-3.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2016-04-01 – 2020-02-15
Countries
Private
JEL codes
O12, O16, D03
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2259

Abstract

Repayment rigidity has been shown to be particularly unfavorable for microfinance borrowers, especially in terms of investment potential. This study proposes an innovative way for Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) to offer repayment flexibility in microfinance contracts, which uses contract price as a screening mechanism. The underlying intuition is that offering repayment flexibility as a more expensive contract option than the standard rigid contract can work as a screening instrument for lenders, with borrowers selecting into the contract that best suits their characteristics. This, in turn, can mitigate default rates. We design and set up a Randomized Controlled Trial (RCT) in Uttar Pradesh, India, to test this hypothesis: in treated branches, the lender offers a flexible repayment option along with the standard rigid contract, the former being more expensive than the latter. In control branches, only the standard, rigid contract is available.
Our experimental design allows us to study two things:
- By focusing on treatment branch only, we can look at borrowers’ selection into flexible vis-à-vis rigid contract by linking borrowers’ characteristics with contract choice
- By comparing treatment (contract choice) with control (only standard contract offered), we can study the impact of offering a flexibility option on business outcomes and repayment rates.
Our work specifically focuses on the design of microfinance contracts, and in particular on the introduction of flexible repayment schedules that can be profitable for both borrowers and the lenders. Second, it studies how borrowers select into different repayment schedules, based on their sensitivity to price and behavioral characteristics (time preferences, risk aversion, financial discipline), as well as on the value they give to continuing their relationship with the lender. In order to study borrowers’ selection, our experimental design does not “exogenously” assign borrowers to a flexible contract (as, for instance, in Field et al., 2013), but allows them to choose between a rigid and a flexible schedule, which are provided simultaneously by the lender.

Intervention

Once clients are ascertained to be eligible for the individual, standard “rigid” loan, customers in treated branches are offered the opportunity to choose between the product they are expecting to receive (i.e. the rigid contract) at 24% interest and a flexible contract offered at an interest rate of 26%.
This flexible loan gives the customers the opportunity to benefit from a three-month repayment holiday, to be exerted any time after the third month of the loan maturity. The first three instalments of the flexible contract require a monthly repayment. During the three-month repayment holiday, borrowers still needed to repay a small fee. Borrowers in control branches were only offered the standard rigid contract at 24%. This contract has been designed with our partner Microfinance Institution for the purpose of the study.

Experimental design

We randomize 28 branches of the partner institution in the state of Uttar Pradesh, India between control and treatment. Randomization of treatment and control branches was done at two stages – first for the 4 city branches and then the 24 non-city branches. The least squared distance method of randomization was adopted to assign branches to treatment and control. Additionally, the sampling distribution at each of the treatment and control branches was fixed in proportion to the average monthly number of loans disbursed at each of the branches. The randomization method adopted pairs branches together based on the minimum distance between two branches and randomly assigns them to treatment and control. Data is collected on a total of 800 households – 400 of whom have received the treatment intervention.
Baseline household survey is administered to the treatment and control clients once their loan is disbursed. Regular follow-ups are conducted via telephonic surveys to capture customers’ delinquencies/defaults. This is further cross checked with the administrative data from the partner institution. A midline survey is conducted half-way through the loan period (12 months post loan disbursal), and an endline survey will be conducted at the end of the 24 month loan period.

Design details

Randomization method
The least squared distance method of randomization was adopted to assign branches to treatment and control. The randomization method adopted pairs branches together based on the minimum distance between two branches and randomly assigns them to treatment and control.
Randomization unit
Randomization of treatment and control branches was done at two stages – first for the 4 city branches and then the 24 non-city branches. The least squared distance method of randomization was adopted to assign branches to treatment and control. Additionally, the sampling distribution at each of the treatment and control branches was fixed in proportion to the average monthly number of loans disbursed at each of the branches.
Clusters
28
Observations
800 suggested, final sample size is 799.
Arms
400 treatment clients across 14 treatment branches
Primary outcomes
In line with Barboni (2017), our primary outcomes of interest are repayment rates, business outcomes including sales, profits, investments (business assets), consumption (expenditures) as well as savings and borrowing. We also intend to study how preferences for repayment flexibility relate to customers’ characteristics, including risk aversion, time preferences, and personality traits.

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Keywords