Understanding Demand for Sharia Compliant Loans: Results of a Randomized Experiment in Jordan

How to cite

Shammout, Nour; Osman, Adam; Karlan, Dean. 2017. "Understanding Demand for Sharia Compliant Loans: Results of a Randomized Experiment in Jordan." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002235. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2235-1.0

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Nour Shammout* , Adam Osman , Dean Karlan

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0002235
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2235-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2014-12-01 – 2017-02-28
Countries
Jordan ()
JEL codes
D12; G21; O12; O16; Z12
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2235

Abstract

Low utilization of credit in developing countries may be partially due to societal norms. We consider one such case in Jordan and compare the demand for a new, sharia-compliant product to a non-compliant product. To comply with the Islamic prohibition on paying or receiving interest, the sharia-compliant product uses a bank fee rather than interest payment structure, while keeping the economics of the product the same as a comparable conventional loan. We find that in this largely Muslim country, consumers offered a sharia-compliant loan increase their application rate from 18% to 22%. We also randomly varied the price of the sharia-compliant product, and find that the less religious individuals in our sample are twice as elastic with respect to price as those who are more religious. We find no evidence of differences between those who apply for the conventional loan and those that apply for the sharia-compliant loan on observable demographics, suggesting that this new product successfully increases utilization of formal financial services without necessarily pulling in more risky individuals.

Experimental design

Individuals were randomly assigned to eight different groups. The first group, serving as the control, were offered a conventional loan to finance household asset purchases from “the Jordan Microfinance Company,” the legal name of Tamweelcom. The remaining seven treatments offered a sharia-compliant loan in some form. The first treatment pitch is a simple mirror of the conventional loan pitch while the second, third, and fourth treatment groups were offered a similar sharia-compliant loan, but the marketing pitch also included a statement about the religious authority that approved the product. The remaining three treatment groups were offered the choice between a conventional loan or a sharia compliant loan with no mention of an authorizing entity.

Design details

Randomization method
Computer randomization (tablet)
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
N/A
Observations
6,037 individuals
Arms
827 individuals in the control group 5,210 individuals in one of seven treatment groups
Primary outcomes
demand for sharia-compliant loans; loan amount requested; composition of borrowers

Papers from this trial

  1. Karlan, Dean, Adam Osman, and Nour Shammout. "To Borrow or Not to Borrow: Religious Norms and the Elasticity of Demand for Credit." Working Paper, February 2017. https://www.povertyactionlab.org/sites/default/files/publications/4267_To-Borrow-or-Not-to-Borrow_Osman-et.al_.Feb%202017pdf.pdf

Cited by

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Keywords