Accountability and taxation: Experimental evidence
How to cite
Sjursen, Ingrid Hoem. 2017. "Accountability and taxation: Experimental evidence." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002233. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2233-3.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Corruption and mismanagement of government revenue is a widespread and serious obstacle to social and economic development in may poor countries. It has frequently been argued that taxing citizens is a promising strategy to promote good governance, because paying tax makes citizens demand more accountability in government expenditures. There is however very little causal evidence of the effect and what may be the underlying mechanisms. Using an online experiment, this project investigates whether and why demand for accountability is higher when revenue is generated through tax compared to when it is windfall. I propose that citizens care more about tax than windfall revenue for two reasons. First, tax revenue is generated by citizens’ hard work, increasing the weight they attach to revenue being spent fairly. Second, money paid in tax has been citizens’ pockets before being collected, increasing their expectations of what to get in return from their payment.
Experimental design
Two-player investment game with possibilities for punishment. The participants are randomly assigned to the role as leader or citizen. The leader decides how much of a group endowment to invest in a common pool with a multiplier of 1.5. He or she gets the share not invested in the common pool for him or her self. The experimental treatments vary how the group endowment is generated.
Design details
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