Beliefs about Behavioral Responses to Taxation

How to cite

Haaland, Ingar; Cappelen, Alexander; Tungodden, Bertil. 2017. "Beliefs about Behavioral Responses to Taxation." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002186. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2186-3.1

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Ingar Haaland* , Alexander Cappelen , Bertil Tungodden

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0002186
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2186-3.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2017-05-02 – 2017-05-31
Countries
United States of America ()
JEL codes
C91, D83, H20
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2186

Abstract

We collect novel data on people's beliefs about behavioral responses to taxation. First, we recruit workers from an online labor market to work on a task for one hour. We randomly manipulate the piece rate offered to the workers and whether they have to pay taxes on their earnings. We use these data to elicit incentivized beliefs from a representative sample of the U.S. population about how taxes affect people's effort choices. In particular, we provide evidence on whether Republicans and Democrats, who have very different views on redistribution of income and wealth, are divided in their beliefs about how taxes affect economic behavior.

Experimental design

We recruit workers from an online labor market to work on a task for one hour. We randomly manipulate the piece rate offered to the workers and whether they have to pay taxes on their earnings. We use these data to elicit incentivized beliefs from a representative sample of the U.S. population about how taxes affect people's effort choices. Our key research question is whether beliefs differ between Republicans and Democrats.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomizer in Qualtrics with the option "evenly present elements".
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
4500 spectators.
Observations
4500 spectators.
Arms
1500 spectators in each treatment (i.e., 1500 spectators in Treatment 1; 1500 spectators in Treatment 2; and 1500 spectators in Treatment 3).
Primary outcomes
The key outcome variable is beliefs about the difference in production between workers in "High Pay" and workers in "Low Pay" (Treatment 1), "Government Tax" (Treatment 2), and "Redistributive Tax" (Treatment 3).

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords