Self-Promoted Altruism: Looking Bad by Doing Good?

How to cite

Born, Andreas; Jacobsson, Christian. 2017. "Self-Promoted Altruism: Looking Bad by Doing Good?." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002166. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2166-3.0

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Andreas Born* , Christian Jacobsson

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0002166
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2166-3.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2017-04-20 – 2017-04-28
Countries
Sweden (Stockholm County)
JEL codes
D64, C91, D03, Z13
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2166

Abstract

In the experiment participants will be able to collect money to The Red Cross in a real effort task resembling the task used by Ariely, Bracha, and Meier (2009). We introduce two different treatments in which we vary the mechanism with which information about donations and the person donating is made public. In both treatments only the 10 participants with a highest donations are announced to everyone by name. Whereas this disclosure of participants' names is automatic in the first treatment, this is subject to choice in the second. We hypothesize firstly, that a significant share of participants in the second treatment will choose to not disclose their name, thereby forego the opportunity to gather social esteem. Secondly, that this behavior by some subjects devalues the opportunity to gather social esteem and hence will lead to lower effort to donate in the second treatment as compared to the first.

Experimental design

In the experiment participants will be able to collect money to The Red Cross in a real effort task resembling the task used by Ariely, Bracha, and Meier (2009). We introduce two different treatments in which we vary the mechanism with which information about donations and the person donating is made public. In both treatments only the 10 participants with a highest donations are announced to everyone by name together with the amount of their donation. Whereas this disclosure of participants' names is automatic in the first treatment, this is subject to choice in the second.

Design details

Randomization method
Subjects draw a seat card from a stack of mixed cards. The card assigns them to a particular spot in one of two rooms (one for each treatment). So both, assignment to the room (=treatment) as well as assignment to a particular seat, is random.
Randomization unit
individual participant
Clusters
1
Observations
200-240 students participating in the experiment
Arms
100-120 participants in each of the two treatments.
Primary outcomes
Number of buttons clicked; Choice whether to reveal name; survey question about difference in donation-effort if choice/no choice; evaluation of social appropriateness of 3 different behaviors (from the post-survey)

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords