Self-Promoted Altruism: Looking Bad by Doing Good?
How to cite
Born, Andreas; Jacobsson, Christian. 2017. "Self-Promoted Altruism: Looking Bad by Doing Good?." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002166. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2166-3.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
In the experiment participants will be able to collect money to The Red Cross in a real effort task resembling the task used by Ariely, Bracha, and Meier (2009). We introduce two different treatments in which we vary the mechanism with which information about donations and the person donating is made public. In both treatments only the 10 participants with a highest donations are announced to everyone by name. Whereas this disclosure of participants' names is automatic in the first treatment, this is subject to choice in the second. We hypothesize firstly, that a significant share of participants in the second treatment will choose to not disclose their name, thereby forego the opportunity to gather social esteem. Secondly, that this behavior by some subjects devalues the opportunity to gather social esteem and hence will lead to lower effort to donate in the second treatment as compared to the first.
Experimental design
In the experiment participants will be able to collect money to The Red Cross in a real effort task resembling the task used by Ariely, Bracha, and Meier (2009). We introduce two different treatments in which we vary the mechanism with which information about donations and the person donating is made public. In both treatments only the 10 participants with a highest donations are announced to everyone by name together with the amount of their donation. Whereas this disclosure of participants' names is automatic in the first treatment, this is subject to choice in the second.
Design details
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