Social Identity and Incentives in Workgroups

How to cite

Yeo, Jonathan. 2017. "Social Identity and Incentives in Workgroups." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002139. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2139-10.299999999999999

Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.

Jonathan Yeo*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0002139
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2139-10.299999999999999
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2017-05-02 – 2019-12-31
Countries
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland ()
JEL codes
C90, C92, D23
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2139

Abstract

The project focuses on the effects of social identity in combination with different economic incentives on outcomes like effort, cooperation and overall productivity. In particular, it aims to test whether common social identity in teams/ work-groups affects the relative effectiveness of cooperative versus competitive based incentives. In addition, we aim to explore the mechanisms by which this arises: e.g. more salient other-regarding social norms/moral preferences.

Intervention

The study will consist of a laboratory experiment of which participants are recruited from the University's behavioural research platform.
They will be paid for turning up as well as their performance in a real effort task. Overall, we have a 2 X 2 treatment design.
Participants will be assigned a group identity according to their relative preferences over 5 pairs of Klee and Kandinsky paintings, with salience increased via a discussion on the artist of the 6th painting. They will then be assigned to teams which are either heterogeneous or homogeneous in group identity. Each team will then be randomly subject to a tournament or team incentive scheme where they complete a real effort task with some cooperative possibility.

Experimental design

The experimental design consists of two parts. The first part consists of assigning group identity among participants and making it salient. The second part consists of a real-effort task in teams which have different compositions of participants from the groups. There will be an element of cooperation in the real-effort task. Teams will be assigned a random incentive structure: a tournament or team scheme.
All participants are then required to fill in a post-experiment questionnaire.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization into different treatment groups by software.
Randomization unit
Participants are randomised into homogeneous or heterogeneous workgroups. Subsequently, workgroups are randomised into tournament or team pay.
Clusters
>=48 workgroups, 6 participants in each workgroup
Observations
>=288 participants
Arms
>=12 workgroups in homogeneous teams, tournament incentives >=12 workgroups in homogeneous teams, team incentives >=12 workgroups in heterogeneous teams, tournament incentives >=12 workgroups in heterogeneous teams, team incentives
Primary outcomes
The key outcomes variables are effort, cooperation and overall productivity.
Secondary outcomes
Secondary outcome variables: 1) measurements of participants' moral and social norms regarding cooperation. 2) Type of helper they are in the experiment.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords