Monitoring and Performance Pay - A Field Experiment with a Large Retail-Chain
How to cite
Vogelsang, Timo; Manthei, Kathrin; Sliwka, Dirk. 2017. "Monitoring and Performance Pay - A Field Experiment with a Large Retail-Chain." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002128. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2128-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Within a large retail chain we introduce a bonus payment and a novel monitoring scheme for store managers, implementing a 2x2 experimental design. The bonus is based on the store’s profit contribution margin (= sales - costs of goods sold - inventory shrinkage - personnel costs). The monitoring scheme is based on systematic biweekly conversation with the respective district manager about the development of the contribution margin.
Store managers in one region in Northern Germany are randomly assigned to one of four treatments. 25% of store managers receive a bonus based on the contribution margin. Another 25% of store managers are assigned to systematic biweekly conversations with their district managers about their actions taken during the past two weeks to influence the contribution margin and their plans for the upcoming weeks. 25% of store managers receive both, the bonus and the new monitoring instrument. The remaining 25% serve as control group.
Based on a theoretical model we hypothesize that that both, giving only the bonus as well as only implementing the monitoring scheme will increase performance compared to the control group. The combination of both will, however, not necessarily further increase the contribution margin as both instruments are substitutes rather than complements.
Experimental design
The intervention takes place in two regions in the North of Germany. We randomly assign districts within each region to either TreatMONIT (1), TreatBON (2), TreatMONITBON (3), or the Control group (4) using stratifications depending on the predicted contribution margin in the first treatment month. Randomization at the district level, although the unit of observation is the store level, gives us the possibility to separate treatment and control groups and only inform them concerning their specific treatment interventions.
Importantly, all store managers (including the control group) get access to an online training on the contribution margin prior to the intervention. Additionally, they receive information about the relative profit margin of each product (this is novel information to them).
All store managers further receive a monthly overview about the development of the contribution margin (and the components) apart from the possible monthly bonus notifications.
TreatBON: Store managers receive a three-month bonus for an increase of their contribution margin above 80% of its planned value (following from the accounting plan for each store). In each month, store managers receive a bonus value of 0.05 * (contribution margin in € - 80% of the plan value). Cumulative bonus values are paid out after three month (capped at zero). Store managers receive monthly feedback on the respective bonus values.
TreatMONIT: Store managers are assigned to a systematic biweekly conversation with their district managers about their actions taken during the past two weeks to influence the contribution margin and their plans for the upcoming weeks. District managers have to take notes during the conversation and send them back to the HR office.
TreatMONITBON: Is a combination of BON and MONIT.
Control: The control group only receives the online training and the access to information about relative profit margins. They are not aware of the other treatment groups.
We briefed the district managers how to react to different sorts of questions concerning the experimental design.
The company’s worker council agreed to this intervention. This serves as an IRB substitute.
Design details
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