Gender and Asymmetric Bargaining
How to cite
Iriberri, Nagore; Hernandez-Arenaz, Iñigo. 2017. "Gender and Asymmetric Bargaining." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002029. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2029-2.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
The gender wage gap is still a real and not fully understood phenomenon. Recently, there has been a shift from more classical explanations to more behavioral explanations.
Following this line, it has been argued that gender differences in the propensity to negotiate and in the actual behavior when negotiating can explain a sizable part of the observed gender wage gap. For example, Card et al. (2016) found that 8% of the existing gender wage gap in Portugal could be explained by men and women behaving differently on these aspects.
One underexplored issue is that of gender interaction effects under asymmetric bargaining situations with one bargaining party being in a stronger position than the other. For example, Hernandez-Arenaz and Iriberri (2017) used data from a TV show with large stakes to study gender differences and gender interaction effects in an alternating-offer bargaining settings between two asymmetric parties. They found that the only matching that shows to be different is that between male proposers (in a strong position) and female responders (in a weak position): in this matching responders demand less yielding bargaining outcomes that are more favourable for proposers. Similar results have been found by Ditrich et al. (2014) and Andersen et al. (2014).
We propose a laboratory experiment to explore gender differences and gender interaction effects in asymmetric bargaining situations. The main design consists of a lab experiment with 4 different treatments which vary the degree and source of the bargaining asymmetry in order to identify gender differences and gender interaction effects when bargaining in a clean randomized lab experiment.
Intervention
We propose a laboratory experiment to explore gender differences and gender interaction effects in asymmetric bargaining situations. The main design consists of a lab experiment with 4 different treatments which vary the degree and source of the bargaining asymmetry in order to identify gender differences and gender interaction effects when bargaining in a clean randomized lab experiment.
Experimental design
The experiment consists of the following treatments:
Symmetric bargaining (Benchmark):
1. Subjects perform a real effort task.
2. Subjects choose the gender avatar that corresponds to their gender.
3. Based on their performance in the real effort task subjects are ranked. The top third is endowed with a productivity of 15 euro, the ones in the intermediate third with a productivity of 10 euro, and the third lowest with a productivity of 5 euro.
4. Each subject is randomly matched with another subject. One is assigned the role of participant A (proposer) and the other the role of Participant B (responder). Participant A is the one with the highest productivity for facilitating comparison across treatments (see below) although this assignment protocol is not communicated to the subjects.
5. For each matching, the pie to bargain over is with probability .5 the productivity of participant A and with .5 the productivity of Participant B.
6. They have 3 minutes to reach a deal on how to split the resulting pie through an alternating-offer bargaining. During the bargaining process Participant A decides over offers to Participant B while Participant B decides over demands from Participant A. During the bargaining, all subjects can see their own avatar and the one of the opponent (their gender and the gender of their matched partner), the size of the pie to be shared and the bargaining history of offers and demands, but they do not observe their individual productivity or their opponent’s. If they reach a deal within the 3 minutes limit, the agreed split is implemented. Otherwise they get 0.
7. Repeat stages 4-6, 9 more times resulting in 10 bargaining periods in total.
Entitlement: Everything is as in the Symmetric treatment except for the fact that they can now observe individual productivities as well as their bargaining partners’productivities. This is public knowledge.
Empowerment: Everything is as in the Symmetric treatment except for the fact that if they do not reach a deal within the 3 minute limit Participant A has an outside option, some random quantity between 0.5 and 0.85 of the total pie while Participant B gets 0. This is public knowledge and the exact amount that Participant A gets as outside option is not disclosed until the end of the 3 minutes.
Information: Everything is as in the Symmetric treatment except for the fact that only Participant A can observe the actual amount to be shared while Participant B only knows that this amount can be 5, 10 or 15 euro. This is public knowledge.
Design details
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