Procrastination and Property Tax Compliance in Philadelphia

How to cite

Sieg, Holger; Chirico, Michael; MacDonald, John; Loeffler, Charles; Inman, Robert. 2017. "Procrastination and Property Tax Compliance in Philadelphia." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0001988. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1988-1.0

Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.

Holger Sieg* , Michael Chirico , John MacDonald , Charles Loeffler , Robert Inman

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0001988
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1988-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2015-03-01 – 2016-07-15
Countries
United States of America ()
JEL codes
H
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/1988

Abstract

Municipal governments commonly confront problems with property tax collection. We model tardy tax payers as procrastinators that have a present bias. Late payments arise due to lack of salience, lack of deterrence or lack of tax morale. To test the importance of the different theoretical explanations, we develop and implements a randomized controlled experiment conducted with the City of Philadelphia. The structure of the experiment allows us to identify the relative importance of the three key sets of parameters of our model.

Intervention

Despite the fact that there are no obvious financial gains to not
paying property taxes, we observe that a significant fraction of tax
payers do not pay on time. To explain the behavior of these
procrastinators, researchers have started to explore the effectiveness
of softer, nudge approaches or notification strategies to reinforce
the different motivations of tax compliance. This paper uses a field
experiment involving over 19,000 delinquent Philadelphia taxpayers to
examine the effectiveness of seven alternative strategies for
improving city property tax collection.

Experimental design

The experiment focuses on delinquent Philadelphia taxpayers to
examine the effectiveness of seven alternative strategies for
improving city property tax collection. Each involves a randomly
assigned tax ``nudge'' of a delinquent taxpayer. The first is a
simple reminder that the payment is late. The next two involve the
reminder plus a threat of a significant sanction if payment is not
received by the end of the calendar year: a lien on the home when sold
equal to taxes due plus accrued interest and penalties or the
lien coupled with an immediate sheriff's sale of the home to collect
the lien. The final four nudges include the reminder coupled with an
appeal to what the tax compliance literature has called a ``tax
morale'' motive for paying one's tax taxes. The
four morale motives included here are: first, a reminder that taxes
pay for neighborhood services such as street repairs, trash pick-up
and the local park; second, a reminder that taxes pay for important
city-wide services such as police protection and public schools;
third, a reminder that 9 out of 10 Philadelphians have paid their
taxes and you have not; and fourth, a reminder that paying one's taxes
is an important obligation of citizenship in a democracy. Tax
compliance after receiving one of the seven ``nudges'' is then
compared to compliance for those who have not received a ``nudge''
dues to random assignment to a holdout sample.

Design details

Randomization method
randomization done in office by a computer
Randomization unit
individual taxpayers
Clusters
not apply
Observations
20,000 taxpayers
Arms
approximately 2,000- 2,500
Primary outcomes
Measures of tax compliance behavior such as full or partial payment received and tax payments received.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords