Enhancing the Efficacy of Teacher Incentives through Loss Aversion: A Field Experiment
How to cite
Fryer, Roland; Sadoff, Sally; List, John; Levitt, Steven D.. 2017. "Enhancing the Efficacy of Teacher Incentives through Loss Aversion: A Field Experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0001971. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1971-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Policymakers agree that strong teachers are necessary to a high-quality education. However, it can be difficult to identify the most successful teachers, particularly in developing countries where absenteeism is pervasive. To better motivate teachers, researchers have studied teacher incentive programs, the link between teacher pay and student achievement. However, there is little evidence that suggests that these standard incentive programs enhance teacher performance. Researchers analyzed whether framing bonus payments in terms of losses (utilizing the notion of loss aversion) rather than gains would cause teachers to respond differently. The main result is that teachers with the loss aversion model had students with higher math scores (between 0.201 and 0.338 standard deviations) than those in the standard incentive program.
Intervention
Researchers worked with the Chicago Heights school district and the teachers' union during the 2010-11 school year. The Chicago Heights district has nine K-8 schools with a total of approximately 3,200 students.
150 teachers joined the program and each was randomly assigned to one of five groups: 1) individual gain, 2) team gain 3) individual loss 4) team loss and 5) control. The program aimed to link financial incentives to student achievement, hoping to increase teacher effort in the classroom.
Experimental design
Researchers worked with the Chicago Heights school district and the teachers' union during the 2010-11 school year. 150 teachers joined the program and each was randomly assigned to one of five groups: 1) individual gain, where teachers received a bonus at the end of the year on a "pay for percentile" formula based on students' test score improvement, 2) team gain, where teachers received a bonus based on improvement in performance versus improvement of students taught by a "teammate" teacher, 3) individual loss, where teachers received $4,000 at the beginning of the school year and would have to return the money if student performance was less than $4,000, 4) team loss, where teachers received a bonus at the start of the year with the actual bonus based on improvement relative to the teammate teacher's students, 5) control, where teachers did not receive a bonus.
The researchers find that students whose teachers were in the "loss" treatments improved math test scores by between 0.201 and 0.338 standard deviations, relative to the control group. However, there was no significant difference in math scores between the "gain" treatments and the control group. Additionally, they reject the null hypothesis that the "gain" and "loss" treatments have the same treatment effects. There was no statistical difference between the "individual" and "team" groups between the "gain" or "loss" models.
Overall, teachers were motivated by loss aversion although the influence of attrition, cash-in-advance and potential cheating could pose a threat to this interpretation.
Design details
Papers from this trial
- Fryer, R. G., Levitt, S. D., List, J., & Sadoff, S. (2012 July). "Enhancing the efficacy of teacher incentives through loss aversion: A field experiment." Working Paper. https://www.povertyactionlab.org/sites/default/files/publications/926%20Teacher%20Incentives%20through%20Loss%20Aversion%20NBER%20Jul2012.pdf
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