Decision rights in moral dilemmas

How to cite

Stein, Caroline; Untertrifaller, Anna. 2017. "Decision rights in moral dilemmas." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0001956. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1956-3.0

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Caroline Stein* , Anna Untertrifaller

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0001956
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1956-3.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2016-12-14 – 2017-04-28
Countries
Germany ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/1956

Abstract

This study deals with the question whether the possession of a decision right in a moral dilemma has an effect on subjects’ effort provision. Especially, in context of debates on empowering employees this question urges empirical evidence to derive practical implications for e.g. compliance management. From previous studies in experimental behavioral economics, we know that having the decision right over a morally neutral situation has a positive effect on effort provision (Fehr et al., 2013; Bartling et al., 2014).
This correlation has not been studied yet for situations of moral dilemmas, though. We think that it is crucial to investigate this additional dimension separately. This is because different strands of experimental research suggest a non-monotonic effect of the possession of a decision right in moral dilemma situations depending on the decision that was implemented. On the one hand, we know that people prefer to give their decision right away instead of making a beneficial but immoral decision on their own in order to not bear the full responsibility (Hamman et al. 2010; Bartling and Fischbacher, 2011). This could be an indication that in case of an immoral decision, the decision would not have a positive but rather negative effect on effort because individuals do not value it.
On the other hand, there is a growing body of evidence that pro-socially motivated agents provide more effort if they work for a pro-social mission (Cassar, 2016). Thus, we expect that executing the task in line with one’s own preference for truth-telling would increase performance, especially in case of the possession of the decision right which might be more valued in case of a moral decision.

Experimental design

We aim to run a laboratory experiment to find a possible correlation between decision rights and effort provision in moral dilemmas. In the experiment participants are grouped into pairs and get assigned either the role of player A or the role of player B. Player B is asked to do a real effort task. Both player A and player B make a decision which task player B shall do. They are then asked to report the chosen task and the respective piece-rate. Piece rates differ by task and both can thus lie about the piece-rate for player B’s real effort task. In 50% of the cases the decisions (task and reported piece-rate) of player A and in 50% of the cases the decisions of player B are implemented.
Before conducting the real effort task, Player B is informed about whether the task of player A or her chosen task will be implemented. In the former case B learns about whether A has overstated the piece-rate of the corresponding task. In this case B is forced to execute an immoral decision.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization is done in the laboratory. People are randomly allocated to roles/pairs and conditions (implementation of the decisions of player A or player B)
Randomization unit
individual
Clusters
Overall, we plan to run 10 sessions and to recruit approximately 320 subjects registered at the CLER (Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research) via ORSEE to the laboratory of the University of Cologne.
Observations
As we cluster on individual level, the number of clusters is the same as the number of observations: 320.
Arms
Our main dependent variable is the effort provision of player B in two different conditions: her decisions (80 observations) or the decisions of player A (80 observations) are implemented.
Primary outcomes
Our main dependent variable is player Bs’ effort provisions. We compare the situations when the implemented decision was made by player B itself to the situation when the other group member made the decision. A subsidiary variable of interest is the binary decision whether or not to lie to analyze the effect of role assignment.

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Keywords