Decomposing Differences in Learning from Private and Social Information

How to cite

Liang, Tingting. 2026. "Decomposing Differences in Learning from Private and Social Information." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0019376. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19376-1.0

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Tingting Liang*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0019376
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19376-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2026-08-25 – 2027-08-25
Countries
United States of America ()
JEL codes
D83, C91, D91
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/19376

Abstract

People frequently learn about the world by observing others’ actions. Experimental evidence suggests that people tend to place less weight on information conveyed by others' actions than on comparable private signals, but the reasons for this difference are less well understood. This experiment decomposes differences in learning from private and social information into three potential mechanisms: a preference for self-generated information, the inferential complexity of extracting information from an action, and beliefs about others' rationality. Participants complete multiple rounds of a belief-updating task in which the information they receive varies across four conditions: drawing their own signal, observing another participant's signal, observing the action of a robot that follows the optimal rule, and observing another participant's action. Participants' willingness-to-pay for each information type is also elicited. The study experimentally quantifies the extent to which each mechanism contributes to the overall difference.

Intervention

For experimental details, see the Experimental Design (Public) section.

Experimental design

This experiment is conducted online on Prolific. Participants complete multiple incentivised rounds of a standard balls-and-urns belief updating task. In each round, there are two boxes of balls, Box A and Box B, each containing a mixture of purple and green balls in symmetric compositions (Box B reverses the colour composition of Box A). The computer randomly selects one of the two boxes as the “True Box”, each with equal chance. Participants receive one piece of information about the True Box and then report the probability that the True Box is Box A versus Box B.

The experiment has 5 parts. The first 4 parts are the main within-subject treatments, with 5 rounds each. These parts vary the type of information participants receive and are presented in randomised order:
1. S-own: the participant draws one ball from the True Box by clicking a button.
2. S-other: the participant sees one ball drawn from the True Box for another participant.
3. A-bot: the participant sees the guess of a robot that sees one ball drawn from the True Box and follows the optimal rule.
4. A-other: the participant sees the guess of another participant who sees one ball drawn from the True Box.

In the A-bot and A-other parts, guesses are displayed as binary symbols indicating which box the actor considered more likely; participants never see the ball behind a guess. The guesses shown in A-other are matched to real choices made by other participants in the corresponding S-own rounds. If an A-other round is selected for bonus payment, the matched participant’s True Box determines the true state.

The four treatments are constructed so that the three adjacent comparisons isolate the mechanisms of interest: S-own vs. S-other identifies the preference for own information; S-other vs. A-bot identifies inferential complexity; and A-bot vs. A-other identifies beliefs about others' rationality.

Within each part, the signal precision (the share of the dominant colour in the box) takes five values: 5/7, 3/4, 4/5, 5/6, and 7/8. Each precision level appears exactly once per part, in random order. Box compositions are displayed in one of four presentation versions: basic (Box A has more purple balls), colour-swapped (Box B has more purple balls), scaled to larger counts at identical ratios, or scaled and colour-swapped. The four presentation versions are randomly assigned across parts without replacement. This ensures that no two parts show exactly the same compositions.

After the last round of each part, participants report their confidence: how certain they are (0-100%) that their belief report, within plus and minus 5 percentage points, is their best choice. At the end of the A-other part, participants additionally report how likely they think it is that the other participant’s guess was based on seeing a purple versus a green ball.

After completing all four parts, participants rank the four information types from most to least useful and briefly explain their ranking in free text.

In the fifth part, I elicit participants' willingness-to-pay for each information type using multiple price lists. The final round differs from the earlier rounds in that, instead of reporting a probability, participants make a binary guess about the True Box and earn a fixed bonus if their guess is correct and nothing otherwise. The final round uses a fixed composition with precision 11/15, which participants see before making their price-list choices. For each information type, participants choose in each of ten rows between seeing information of that type in the final round and receiving a fixed amount of extra money, ranging from $0 to $0.9 in $0.1 increments. The order of the four price lists is randomised. The computer then randomly selects one information type and one row and implements the participant's choice in the final round. Participants see the information if they choose it. If they choose the money, they do not see the information and receive the corresponding amount of extra money if this round is selected for payment. In both cases, they then guess the True Box and report their confidence in that guess.

Finally, participants answer a set of demographic and feedback questions.

The study also includes two attention checks. Participants who fail either attention check or receive a low-authenticity rating on either of Prolific's LLM or bot authenticity checks will be excluded from the main analyses.

Design details

Randomization method
All randomisation done by a computer.
Randomization unit
The four information treatments vary within participant, and the order is randomised at the participant level.
Clusters
350 participants
Observations
7000 posterior belief reports: 350 participants * 4 information types * 5 rounds 1400 confidence reports: 350 participants * 4 information types 1400 willingness-to-pay observations: 350 participants * 4 information types
Arms
All 350 participants complete all four within-subject treatments.
Primary outcomes
Posterior beliefs: the reported probability (0–100%) assigned to the state favoured by the information received. The objects of interest are the three adjacent treatment comparisons, each measuring one mechanism's contribution to the overall difference in response to private and social information.
Secondary outcomes
The secondary outcomes are willingness-to-pay (WTP), confidence, and usefulness rankings for the four information types. Beyond belief updating, I examine additional aspects of participants' responses to private and social information: their valuation of each information type, their confidence in beliefs formed from it, and their subjective rankings of its usefulness. I also compare WTP, confidence, and usefulness rankings across the four information conditions to explore the potential mechanisms behind these differences. I also consider several exploratory analyses: 1. Individual-level associations across outcomes. I test whether participants' responses to different information types show consistent or different patterns across beliefs, WTP and confidence. 2. Heterogeneity by signal precision. I test whether each mechanism’s contribution varies across the five signal precision levels. 3. Heterogeneity in participant response types. I test whether participants can be grouped according to their response patterns across the four information conditions. For example, one mechanism may account for most of the overall difference for some participants, whereas others may respond similarly to all four information types. 4. Beliefs about others' rationality. I test how much this belief can account for the difference in behaviour between the A-bot and A-other conditions.

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Keywords