How Do Government Unemployment Benefit Programs Affect Worker-Firm Relational Contracts? An Experiment

How to cite

Luo, Yaqiong; Xie, Huan. 2026. "How Do Government Unemployment Benefit Programs Affect Worker-Firm Relational Contracts? An Experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0019368. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19368-1.0

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Yaqiong Luo* , Huan Xie

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0019368
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19368-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2026-09-21 – 2027-05-30
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C92, J41, J65
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/19368

Abstract

We conduct a lab experiment based on a repeated worker-firm gift-exchange game with unemployment-benefit policies. Using a three-arm between-subjects design, we examine the effects of introducing unemployment benefits and varying benefit eligibility based on current unemployment versus recent employment history. Our experiment sheds light on how social insurance rules shape relational incentives and cooperation in labor-market interactions.

Experimental design

In the experiment, we implement a repeated worker-firm gift-exchange game in a laboratory labor-market setting. Participants are assigned to fixed roles as firms or workers and interact repeatedly within the same market. Firms make wage offers with desired effort levels, workers decide whether to accept employment or remain unemployed, and employed workers choose actual effort. We use a three-arm between-subjects design. The treatment variation concerns the unemployment-benefit environment: a baseline labor-market environment is compared with two unemployment-benefit regimes that differ in their eligibility requirements. The design allows us to study how unemployment-benefit rules affect relational incentives and repeated worker-firm interactions.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done by computer.
Randomization unit
Treatments are randomized at the session level. Within each session, participants are randomly assigned to fixed roles as firms or workers at the beginning of the experiment.
Clusters
15 sessions.
Observations
180 participants.
Arms
60 participants per treatment arm.
Primary outcomes
Relational cooperation, labor-market performance, and relationship stability.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords