How Do Government Unemployment Benefit Programs Affect Worker-Firm Relational Contracts? An Experiment
How to cite
Luo, Yaqiong; Xie, Huan. 2026. "How Do Government Unemployment Benefit Programs Affect Worker-Firm Relational Contracts? An Experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0019368. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19368-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We conduct a lab experiment based on a repeated worker-firm gift-exchange game with unemployment-benefit policies. Using a three-arm between-subjects design, we examine the effects of introducing unemployment benefits and varying benefit eligibility based on current unemployment versus recent employment history. Our experiment sheds light on how social insurance rules shape relational incentives and cooperation in labor-market interactions.
Experimental design
In the experiment, we implement a repeated worker-firm gift-exchange game in a laboratory labor-market setting. Participants are assigned to fixed roles as firms or workers and interact repeatedly within the same market. Firms make wage offers with desired effort levels, workers decide whether to accept employment or remain unemployed, and employed workers choose actual effort. We use a three-arm between-subjects design. The treatment variation concerns the unemployment-benefit environment: a baseline labor-market environment is compared with two unemployment-benefit regimes that differ in their eligibility requirements. The design allows us to study how unemployment-benefit rules affect relational incentives and repeated worker-firm interactions.
Design details
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