Digital Credit and Financial Behavior

How to cite

Fracchia, Mattia; Loiacono, Francesco; Cavalcante, Vitor. 2026. "Digital Credit and Financial Behavior." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0019347. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19347-2.0

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Mattia Fracchia* , Francesco Loiacono , Vitor Cavalcante

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0019347
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19347-2.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2026-08-17 – 2027-06-30
Countries
Private
JEL codes
D14, D83, G21, G51, G53, O16
Secondary IDs
International Growth Centre project P-0003963, Digital Credit and Financial Behavior
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/19347

Abstract

Digital credit through mobile money has expanded rapidly in Mozambique. Yet many users do not know the basic terms of the products available to them, including the service fee, the repayment deadline, the automatic deduction of wallet inflows while a debt is unpaid, and the consequences of non-payment. This study tests whether accurate information about Txuna, the digital credit product offered through M-Pesa, changes how market micro-entrepreneurs in Maputo understand and use digital credit. We interview approximately 1,400 micro-entrepreneurs aged 21 or older who hold an active M-Pesa account registered in their own name, in 14 markets randomly drawn from the official municipal register of Maputo markets and stratified by municipal district and market category. Within each market, respondents are approached using a random walk protocol with a fixed skip interval and pre-defined starting points. After consent and the collection of all pre-treatment modules, the survey software assigns each respondent, with probability one-half, to treatment or control. The treatment group watches a video stating the range of loan amounts, the service fee at each repayment term with worked examples, the fact that the fee is identical for every user and that the debt stops growing after the deadline, the automatic deduction of a share of every wallet inflow while a debt is unpaid, and the reporting of non-payment to the Credit Registry of the Bank of Mozambique. The treatment group is then offered an optional assisted eligibility check, which each participant completes on their own handset. Treated respondents also keep a wallet-sized card that restates the same terms in printed form, namely the minimum and maximum loan amounts, the fee at each of the three repayment terms with the worked example on a loan of 1,000 meticais, and the two steps needed to check one's own eligibility in the M-Pesa menu. The card stays with the participant, so the information remains available whenever they want to check it while considering a loan. The control group watches a placebo video on the everyday role of mobile money that carries no information on any service, cost, product, or credit, and receives neither the card nor the assisted check. We measure effects on beliefs about the terms of the product, on comprehension of the pricing rule at a loan amount never shown, on spontaneous knowledge, on stated intentions, on choices in hypothetical credit scenarios, and, for participants who consent to data linkage, on take-up, repayment, and mobile money use observed in administrative records 30, 90, and 180 days after the interview. The sign of the effect on borrowing is not predicted. Accurate terms can raise take-up when borrowers overestimate the cost or wrongly believe they are ineligible, and lower it when borrowers underestimate the cost or are unaware of the automatic deduction and the credit registry consequences. We therefore measure the direction of each participant's initial belief gap before the intervention, which is what separates these two cases.

Intervention

Participants are interviewed once, in person, at their stall or place of business in a Maputo market. Every participant watches a video on the enumerator's tablet, at the same point in the interview, immediately after prior beliefs are collected.

The treatment has three components, delivered at two points in the interview. The video and the eligibility check come together, immediately after prior beliefs are collected. The card comes at the very end, after the questionnaire is complete. Because the video and the check both precede outcome measurement, the survey outcomes reflect those two components jointly. The card is handed over after every survey outcome is recorded, so it can only affect the administrative outcomes measured 30, 90, and 180 days later.

The treatment group watches a video on the terms of Txuna, the digital credit product offered through M-Pesa. It covers three things a borrower cannot readily infer from the handset menu: what the product costs, how much a given person can borrow, and what follows from late repayment. The price is given for each of the three repayment terms with worked examples, and it is the same for every user rather than something earned through a good repayment record. Borrowing capacity is explained as an individual limit within a stated range, set automatically and available to check free of charge. On late repayment, the video covers what happens to the balance once the term has passed, how money entering the wallet is used to repay, the potential legal consequences of non-repayment, and how reporting affects future access to formal credit. Each of these corresponds to a belief measured before the video.

Treated participants are then offered an optional check of their own eligibility and borrowing limit, which each completes on their own handset. The check addresses a barrier the video cannot reach. A person may understand the terms perfectly and still not borrow because they do not know whether the product is open to them, or how to find out. Because the limit is set automatically from a person's transaction history, no general message can convey it. Only checking the participant's own account can reveal it.

Treated participants also receive a wallet-sized card at the end of the interview, once the questionnaire is complete. It restates the same terms in print: the minimum and maximum loan amounts, the fee at each repayment term with a worked example, and the two steps needed to check eligibility. The card stays with the participant, so the information remains available whenever they want to check it while considering a loan.

The control group watches a placebo video on the everyday role of mobile money in Mozambique. It names no product, gives no price, and never mentions credit or Txuna. It states in general terms that different operators and services carry different menus, costs, and conditions, which is the only reference to cost anywhere in it. The placebo holds constant the interruption of the working day, the presence of a video, the tablet, the enumerator's silence during playback, and the video's position in the interview, so the comparison turns on the message content rather than on having been given attention.

The control group receives no check, no card, and no product information during the interview or afterward while borrowing behavior is measured. Once the administrative outcome window has closed, they receive the correct terms and the same card.

Experimental design

One-visit survey experiment with micro-entrepreneurs trading in Maputo markets. We sample markets first, then respondents within markets, and randomize treatment at the respondent level.

We drew fourteen markets from the official municipal register of Maputo markets, Resolution number 94/AM/2008 of the Maputo Municipal Assembly approving the Markets and Fairs By-law. Markets serve as sampling units only. Both arms are present in every market, so markets are sampling clusters and not treatment units, and all specifications include market fixed effects. We allocate interviews across markets in proportion to market size rather than equally.

Within each market, enumerators approach respondents by a fixed protocol with office-drawn starting points that leaves no selection to the enumerator, and they substitute neither refusals nor ineligible respondents. Eligibility requires being 21 years of age or older, owning or being self-employed in a business operating in the market, and holding an active M-Pesa account registered in the respondent's own name with the handset present at the interview.

After consent, and after we collect all baseline covariates and prior beliefs, the survey software assigns treatment at the individual level with probability one-half. The respondent then watches the video assigned to their arm. We measure all survey outcomes in the same visit, with no follow-up survey. For participants who consent to data linkage, we add M-Pesa administrative records from 30, 90, and 180 days after the interview date.

Design details

Randomization method
Market selection. Done by computer in the office, in Stata, before fieldwork began, with fourteen markets as a pre-specified target rather than a number derived from the frame. We drew the fourteen from a frame of 27 units, built from the official municipal register of Maputo markets, as set out in Resolution number 94/AM/2008 of the Maputo Municipal Assembly approving the Markets and Fairs By-law. The frame is cross-classified on two dimensions. The first is the municipal district, namely KaMpfumo, Nlhamankulu, KaMaxakeni, KaMavota, and KaMubukwana, the five mainland districts of Maputo City. The second is the market category in the by-law, namely Class A, Class B, and Class C for formal markets, and a fourth category for informal markets. Together the two dimensions define 13 non-empty cells across the 27 units. District is the explicit stratum. We allocated the fourteen markets across districts in proportion to the number of frame units in each, by largest remainders with a floor of one market per district, giving three to KaMpfumo, three to Nlhamankulu, two to KaMaxakeni, two to KaMavota, and four to KaMubukwana. Category is the implicit stratum. We sorted each district's units by category before a systematic selection with a random start, so the draw spreads across categories within district in proportion to their frequency in that district. Each unit has a known, non-zero inclusion probability equal to its district allocation divided by its district frame size, and carries the corresponding design weight. We fixed the seeds before running the draw, with a master seed and one derived seed per district, so the draw is reproducible from the do-file. Respondent selection within market. No list of traders exists from which to draw a sample, so selection is systematic rather than a lottery. Enumerators follow a fixed traversal route from a pre-defined starting position, taking every fifth stall, which removes enumerator discretion, with a birthday rule to choose among eligible people at the same stall. Treatment assignment. Done by the survey software, SurveyCTO, on the enumerator's tablet during the interview. A stored once(random()) call draws a uniform number once per respondent, only after consent and after every pre-treatment module is complete, and maps it to treatment with probability 0.5. The form retains the assignment timestamp. Enumerators cannot anticipate the arm while selecting, screening, or consenting a respondent, and they cannot redraw it. Treatment assignment is not stratified.
Randomization unit
Individual respondent, single-level randomization. The survey form assigns treatment to each respondent separately, so both arms are present in every market and in every enumerator's caseload. Markets are sampling units, not treatment assignments, and the same holds for stalls and enumerator-days.
Clusters
Treatment is randomized at the individual level, so there are no randomization clusters. The sample is drawn in 14 market clusters, with both arms present in each.
Observations
1,400 individuals aged 21 or older, owning or self-employed in a business in the market, and holding an active M-Pesa account registered in their own name. Interviews are allocated across the 14 markets in proportion to measured market size rather than equally.
Arms
700 individuals in the control group and 700 individuals in the treatment group. Assignment is an independent draw with probability one-half per respondent, so realized arm sizes will deviate slightly from equality.
Primary outcomes
Beliefs about the terms of Txuna, measured in the same visit immediately after the intervention. Accuracy of posterior beliefs relative to the true contract terms, reported separately for the items asked identically before and after the intervention at the amounts used in the video, and for the transfer item asked at a loan amount never shown in the video. Txuna take-up. Any Txuna loan taken within 30 days and within 90 days of the interview, measured in M-Pesa administrative records for participants who consent to data linkage.
Secondary outcomes
Measured in the interview, immediately after the video. - Open-ended recall of what happens to the debt after the deadline, of what happens to money entering the wallet while a debt is unpaid, and of the consequences of non-payment. - Description of the steps needed to check one's own eligibility or limit, and the reported chance of completing that check alone. - Recognition of the consequences of non-payment from a closed list read after all open-ended items. - Stated chance of checking one's own eligibility or limit within 7 days. - Stated chance of trying to take a Txuna loan within 30 days, the intended amount, the intended repayment term, the stated chance of repaying by the chosen deadline, the expected source of repayment, and the purpose of the loan. - Identifying the cheaper of two credit offers, and the choice between an informal moneylender and a hypothetical digital credit product across three scenarios. - Reported reasons for not taking a Txuna loan now, and the stated chance of receiving money on another account while holding an unpaid Txuna debt. - For the treatment group only, acceptance of the assisted eligibility check and its outcome as reported by the participant. This is a descriptive measure of offer take-up within the treatment arm, not a comparison across arms. Measured in M-Pesa administrative records for consenting participants. - Whether the participant checks their Txuna eligibility or limit, if the provider records this action. - Repayment behavior conditional on borrowing, the chosen repayment term, arrears, and time spent in unpaid-debt status. - Incoming transfers, wallet activity, and shifts of inflows away from the M-Pesa account while indebted, which is the avoidance response implied by the automatic deduction.

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