Measuring Anticipation of Discrimination in Cooperation Dilemmas
How to cite
Rustagi, Devesh. 2026. "Measuring Anticipation of Discrimination in Cooperation Dilemmas." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0019339. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19339-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Does anticipation of discrimination, beliefs individuals have about the behavior of others toward them, affect trust and cooperation? We develop a novel design to isolate the role of anticipation of discrimination in cooperation dilemmas using a trust game. We capture the effect of anticipation as the double difference between the amount transferred by trustors to outgroup vs. ingroup trustees when the trustor's own identity is revealed vs. concealed. We conduct this study in UK and US in the context of affective polarization. In addition, we implement the trustee's decision using the strategy method. This allows us to study whether trustees hold taste for discrimination. We combine our game with survey measures of trust and affective polarization, and also collect data on beliefs. Finally, we also aim to implement an information treatment to test if anticipation disappears.
Intervention
we conduct a trust game with a 2x2 design: identities revealed vs concealed and ingroup vs outgroup. These conditions are randomly assigned. We then give information on the average of conditional responses of trustees to trustors to see if anticipation still survives.
Experimental design
we conduct a trust game with a 2x2 design: identities revealed vs concealed and ingroup vs outgroup. These conditions are randomly assigned. We then give information on the average of conditional responses of trustees to trustors to see if anticipation still survives.
Design details
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