Responsibility-Sensitive Fairness and Carbon Tax Rebates
How to cite
Knoche, Anton; Funke, Franziska; Pahle, Michael. 2026. "Responsibility-Sensitive Fairness and Carbon Tax Rebates." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0019316. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19316-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Do people hold responsibility-sensitive fairness preferences regarding others' greenhouse gas emissions? We study this question in the context of the German heating transition through an incentivized survey experiment fielded in the German Heating and Housing Panel. In a randomized factorial design, participants allocate carbon pricing rebates between households that differ in responsibility-relevant conditions at the time of their heating technology choice. Exogenous variation in policy environments—information about future CO₂ costs and access to subsidies for climate-friendly alternatives—identifies how information and economic capacity shape judgments of responsibility and deservingness. This allows us to isolate responsibility-sensitive fairness preferences and compare them to income-based redistributive motives, providing causal evidence on how citizens incorporate responsibility into climate compensation judgments.
Intervention
We embed an incentivized survey experiment in Wave 6 of the German Heating and Housing Panel. Respondents complete three incentivized spectator-style allocation tasks in which they divide a carbon pricing rebate of 300 Euro between two households whose characteristics are varied experimentally. Respondents are randomly assigned to one of two information treatments or a control condition. The treatments provide short informational texts about the German policy environment surrounding residential heating technology choices.
Experimental design
The experiment is embedded in Wave 6 of the German Heating and Housing Panel, an annual online household panel survey. Respondents are randomly assigned to one of two information treatments or a control group and subsequently complete three incentivized spectator-style allocation tasks in which they divide a fixed carbon pricing rebate of 300 Euro between two households whose characteristics are varied experimentally (factorial vignette design). Allocation decisions are incentivized: one randomly drawn decision is implemented, with rebate amounts paid out to randomly selected panel households that display the corresponding characteristics.
Design details
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