Ingroup Bias in Regulatory Enforcement and Implications for Food Integrity

How to cite

Anwari, Anisah; Monteiro, Diogo Souza. 2026. "Ingroup Bias in Regulatory Enforcement and Implications for Food Integrity." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0019285. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19285-1.0

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Anisah Anwari* , Diogo Souza Monteiro

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0019285
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19285-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2026-08-01 – 2026-12-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/19285

Abstract

This study will investigate whether shared group identity, induced using the Minimal Group Paradigm, influences food standards monitoring decisions and whether a professional impartiality reminder reduces any ingroup bias. While inspectors are expected to be impartial, shared group identity may unconsciously influence their monitoring decisions. In a monitoring context, this may result in inspectors allocating fewer monitoring units to ingroup firms than to outgroup firms, increasing the risk that non-compliance remains undetected within the ingroup and undermining the integrity of food standards systems. This study will use an oTree-programmed online experiment conducted on Prolific Academic. Experimental sessions will be randomly assigned to either a control condition or a professional impartiality reminder condition. Each session will consist of 20 participants, where they will be randomly assigned to one of two arbitrary colour groups (Blue or Green) and to one of two roles (Food Standards Inspector or Food Producer). Their assigned colour groups and roles will remain fixed throughout the session. Across ten repeated rounds, inspectors will allocate five monitoring units between two ingroup and two outgroup producers, while producers will generate and report food quality grades and may choose to misreport. Participants will be randomly rematched in each round following a stranger matching design. The primary objective will be to test whether inspectors allocate fewer monitoring units to ingroup than to outgroup producers and whether the professional impartiality reminder reduces this ingroup bias. Some exploratory analysis will also be conducted to explore how inspectors update their monitoring decisions following the detection of ingroup and outgroup non-compliance and whether differential monitoring leads to higher rates of undetected non-compliance.

Intervention

Intervention 1: Control
In the control condition, participants assigned to the Food Standards Inspector role will complete the monitoring experiment without receiving a professional impartiality reminder. They will receive the standard experimental instructions describing their assigned colour group, role and tasks.

Intervention 2: Professional impartiality reminder
In the professional impartiality reminder condition, participants assigned to the Food Standards Inspector role will complete the same monitoring experiment as the control group. In addition to the standard instructions, inspectors will receive a professional impartiality reminder based on the principle of impartiality in ISO/IEC 17020. The reminder will be presented before the first monitoring allocation decision and will be displayed once more as a pop-out at a randomly selected round between Rounds 4 and 10. Participants must acknowledge the pop-out reminder before proceeding with the monitoring allocation decision.

Experimental design

Participants will be recruited through Prolific Academic to take part in a multiplayer online experiment programmed in oTree. Eligible participants must be 18 years of age or older, fluent in English, have a Prolific approval rating of at least 95%, and have normal colour vision to distinguish the colours used in the experiment. All eligibility criteria will be screened using Prolific's prescreening filters before participants can access the study. Participants who meet the eligibility criteria and provide informed consent will complete a brief video-based attention check. Participants will be given a maximum of two attempts to answer the attention check correctly before proceeding to the experiment.

Procedures:
1. 20 participants will join the online experiment session on Prolific Academic. Each session will be randomly assigned to either the control condition or the professional impartiality reminder condition.
2. Participants will provide their consent and complete a brief video-based attention check.
3. Upon completion, participants will remain on a waiting page until all participants have arrived and are ready to begin the experiment. If not all participants arrive within 10 minutes, the session will not proceed, and participants who did arrive will receive a fixed compensation payment for their time.
4. Participants will be randomly assigned to one of two arbitrary colour groups (Blue or Green). They will be informed of their assigned group, which will remain fixed throughout the session.
5. Participants will then be randomly assigned to undertake the role of either Food Standards Inspector or Food Producer.
6. Participants will receive role-specific instructions, earnings and complete a role-specific comprehension check before proceeding to their task.
7. The Inspector’s task is to allocate monitoring units across four Food Producers, two of which are their ingroup.
8. The Food Producers’ task is to report their food quality grade. Reporting higher than their actual food quality grade increases their earnings, but there are risks of being monitored for non-compliance. None, some or all Food Producers' reporting activities will be monitored in each round.
9. The experiment consists of 10 rounds. Each Inspector will be matched with four Food Producers comprising two ingroup and two outgroup producers. Participants will be randomly rematched using a stranger matching design in the subsequent rounds. Although repeated Inspector–Food Producer encounters may occur by chance, Food Producers will be assigned temporary identities in each round to prevent producer-specific reputation formation.
10. At the end of each round, participants will receive their round result.
11. After completing all ten rounds, one round will be randomly selected for earnings. Participants will received earnings from the selected round and the participation fee.
12. Participants will complete a post-experiment survey comprising demographic questions, risk attitude, group identity measures, and role-specific attitudinal measures.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization is programmed and implemented in oTree using its built-in random assignment functions.
Randomization unit
Session and Individual. Treatment assignment will occur at the session level, with each experimental session randomly assigned to either the control condition or the professional impartiality reminder condition. Consequently, all participants within the same session will receive the same experimental condition. Within each session, participants will be randomly assigned to one of two arbitrary colour groups (Blue or Green) and to one of two roles: Food Standards Inspector or Food Producer. In each round, each inspector will be randomly matched with four Food Producers comprising two ingroup and two outgroup producers. This group composition will remain fixed across rounds, while the specific inspector–producer matches will be randomised in each round.
Clusters
Up to 44 experimental sessions, comprising 4 pilot sessions (2 control and 2 professional impartiality reminders) and 40 main experimental sessions. Main experimental sessions will be allocated equally between the two conditions. The final number will be determined based on a formal power calculation following the pilot.
Observations
Each experimental session will comprise 20 participants. At most 880 participants across including the pilot (176 Inspectors and 704 Food Producers). The final number will be determined based on a formal power calculation following the pilot.
Arms
Equally between the two conditions. The final number will be determined based on a formal power calculation following the pilot.
Primary outcomes
Number of monitoring units allocated to each food producer in each round.
Secondary outcomes
1. Undetected non-compliance (binary) 2. Monitoring allocation updating following non-compliance detection

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Keywords