Economists’ Narratives, Economic Literacy, and Support for Rent Control

How to cite

Brade, Raphael; Burdea, Valeria. 2026. "Economists’ Narratives, Economic Literacy, and Support for Rent Control." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0019283. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19283-1.1

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Raphael Brade* , Valeria Burdea

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0019283
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19283-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2026-08-03 – 2028-07-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
A20, C83, D72, D83, D91, R21, R31
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/19283

Abstract

We will conduct a large-scale online survey with a quota-representative sample of approximately 7,500 German adults. Using the case of rent control – a prominent and highly salient price-control policy on which economists and the public often appear to disagree – we study people’s understanding of the effects (mental models) of price control policies and the limits of expert persuasion. Our aims are to:
a) elicit and characterize the mental models that individuals hold about the effects of stricter rent control, using both open-ended (unstructured) and structured elicitation, and relate these mental models to individuals’ economic literacy;
b) test whether exposure to economists’ economic narratives against stricter rent control shifts individuals’ mental models and their support for the policy; and
c) test whether the persuasiveness of these narratives depends on a signal that economists disagree about the policy, and whether responsiveness to the narratives and to the disagreement signal differs between individuals with high and low economic literacy.
Using survey experiments together with a pre-treatment measure of economic literacy to distinguish subgroups of participants with high and low economic literacy, we address the following specific research questions:
i) What mental models do individuals hold about the effects of stricter rent control, do these mental models depend on economic literacy, does support for stricter rent control itself depend on economic literacy, and which mental models are associated with support for stricter rent control?
ii) Do economists’ economic narratives about stricter rent control causally affect individuals’ mental models and their support for the policy, and does this responsiveness depend on economic literacy?
iii) Does the effect of economists’ narratives depend on whether there is a signal of disagreement among economists, and does the effect of the disagreement signal differ between individuals with high and low economic literacy?

Intervention

The survey experiment manipulates two dimensions, independently at the individual level.
(1) Economic narrative. After respondents are informed about the status quo of rent regulation in Germany and the proposed stricter policy, and after an open-ended (unstructured) elicitation of their prior mental model, respondents are randomly assigned to one of three conditions:
• Control: no narrative is presented.
• Economists’ Economic Narrative: respondents read a short text summarizing the economic assessment of stricter rent regulation drawn from the 2024/25 annual report of the German Council of Economic Experts („Wirtschaftsweise“).
• Economists’ Economic Narrative with Disagreement Signal: respondents read the same narrative, and, in addition, they receive information that the assessment is shared by four of the five Council members and that one member has issued a dissenting minority opinion.
(2) Post-treatment elicitation. Orthogonally to the narrative treatment, respondents are randomly assigned to either a No-Elicitation branch (no structured elicitation of the post-treatment mental model) or a Structured-Elicitation branch (structured elicitation of the post-treatment mental model along a fixed set of eight outcome dimensions). This second randomization allows us to assess whether structured elicitation itself primes particular mechanisms and shapes policy-support responses. Both dimensions are assigned in a single draw, so that each respondent is allocated to one of six equally likely conditions (see Randomization Method).

Experimental design

We conduct the survey experiment with a quota-representative sample of approximately 7,500 German adults. The survey is programmed and hosted using the Tivian license of the ifo Institute; respondents are provided by the online panel provider Talk Online Panel, subject to representativeness quotas (gender, age, federal state, education, employment status, renter vs. non-renter, and municipality size). Participants answer questions autonomously on their own digital devices. Randomization is performed by the survey software. The panel provider also supplies survey weights; the main analyses are unweighted, and weighted estimates are reported in robustness checks.
The survey proceeds in the following order: (1) landing page and a willingness-to-write screening item ; (2) quota demographics; (3) pre-treatment moderators, including housing situation and self-interest items, expectations about local rents and house prices, economic values, interest in and consumption of economic news, trust in and perceived competence of economists, self-assessed economic understanding, a 10-item economic-literacy test, and beliefs about own test performance; (4) an attention check; (5) information on rent increases since 2010 and an open-ended diagnosis of their perceived causes; (6) a description of the rent-control status quo and the proposed stricter policy; (7) an open-ended (unstructured) elicitation of the prior mental model and confidence in it; (8) randomization, in a single draw, into one of six conditions defined by the three narrative conditions and the two elicitation branches; (9) policy-support questions; (10) additional demographics and cognitive controls; and (11) an outro. The follow-up survey is fielded two to four weeks later and includes a reminder of (6) and repeats (7), (9), trust in economists, and additionally includes questions on perceived disagreement on rent control among economists, as well as two questions on whether people remember the treatment content from the main survey

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization is carried out by the randomizer of the survey software (Tivian). Each respondent is assigned in a single draw to one of six equally likely conditions, defined by the cross of the three narrative conditions (Control; Economic Narrative; Economic Narrative with Disagreement Signal) and the two elicitation branches (No Elicitation; Structured Elicitation). This is equivalent to assigning the narrative condition and the elicitation branch independently at the individual level. Assignment probabilities do not depend on respondent characteristics.
Randomization unit
Individual level.
Clusters
Approximately 7,500 individuals.
Observations
Approximately 7,500 individuals in the main survey; approximately 6,000 individuals in the follow-up survey (an 80% recontact rate).
Arms
Randomization is into six equally sized cells defined by the cross of the three narrative conditions and the two elicitation branches: approximately 1,250 respondents per cell. This implies approximately 2,500 respondents per narrative condition (Control; Economic Narrative; Economic Narrative with Disagreement Signal) and approximately 3,750 respondents in each of the No-Elicitation and Structured-Elicitation branches. Outcomes that are observed only in the Structured-Elicitation branch (the structured mental model) are therefore available for approximately 1,250 respondents per narrative condition, and the Control condition contains approximately 1,250 respondents in each elicitation branch.
Primary outcomes
(i) Individuals’ support for the proposed stricter rent-control policy; and (ii) individuals’ mental models about the effects of stricter rent control.
Secondary outcomes
i) Individuals’ mental models about the effects of stricter rent control, including mechanism uptake, the residual and total breadth of the model, confidence in the elicited model, a low-effort-response indicator, and the individual dimensions of the structured elicitation battery; ii) support for other housing policies, relative support for rent control, and support for other price-control policies; and iii) trust in and perceived competence of economists and beliefs about disagreement among economists.

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Keywords