Bureaucratic Deliberation and Performance: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin

How to cite

Aman-Rana, Shan; Wantchekon, Leonard; Kovo, Lazare. 2026. "Bureaucratic Deliberation and Performance: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0019263. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19263-1.0

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Shan Aman-Rana* , Leonard Wantchekon , Lazare Kovo

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0019263
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19263-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2016-08-01 – 2019-12-31
Countries
Benin (Africa)
JEL codes
D73, H11, H83, O1
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/19263

Abstract

Bureaucratic performance depends not only on individual incentives and ability but also on beliefs about how others in the organization behave. This study tests whether deliberation—an institutional process in which objective, performance-relevant information about the bureaucracy as a whole is made public and discussed collectively—can improve performance. We conduct a cluster-randomized controlled trial with municipal administrations in Benin: 20 municipalities (10 treatment, 10 control) drawn from the country's 77, spanning 8 of 12 departments. Treated municipalities held three structured deliberation sessions (September–November 2016) presenting, respectively, the municipal audit report, a survey of bureaucrats, and a survey of citizens. Using a municipality-year panel of administrative audit data from 2014 to 2019, we find that deliberation improved municipal performance by about 9 percent of the control mean: it reduced financial irregularities, moved procurement away from less competitive procedures, strengthened project implementation (cutting work stoppages and advancing new projects), and reallocated investment toward service-delivery sectors. An endline bureaucrat survey shows that bureaucrats negatively updated beliefs about corruption and rule enforcement, belief dispersion within municipalities fell, meeting attention shifted toward audit findings and corruption, and interpersonal trust declined.

Intervention

Treated municipalities received a structured deliberation intervention: three sessions held at monthly intervals (September, October, and November 2016), convened by the municipal administration and led by the Secretary General. Each session lasted approximately 90 minutes and followed the same format across municipalities — a presentation of performance-relevant information followed by open collective discussion. The three sessions covered, respectively: (1) the municipality's most recent CoNaFiL audit report and the auditors' findings and recommendations; (2) results of a survey of the municipality's bureaucrats; and (3) results of a survey of citizens. All information was presented as aggregate, organization-level summaries rather than assessments of individual bureaucrats. All bureaucrats in the municipality were invited and attendance was voluntary; bureaucrats retained control of the agenda; mayors were not permitted to attend, though bureaucrats could invite additional participants (e.g., councilors, civil-society representatives, central-government officials, or media) where relevant. The aim was to make objective, performance-relevant information about the bureaucracy as a whole public within the organization and open to collective discussion. Control municipalities held no such sessions.

Experimental design

The experiment was conducted across 20 municipalities in Benin (of the country's 77), spanning 8 of 12 departments, with 10 municipalities assigned to treatment and 10 to control; randomization was at the municipality level. In treated municipalities, the municipal administration convened three structured deliberation sessions (September, October, and November 2016), each approximately 90 minutes, presenting respectively: (1) the municipality's most recent CoNaFiL audit report and auditor recommendations; (2) results of a representative survey of bureaucrats; and (3) results of a representative survey of citizens. Performance information was presented as aggregate, organization-level summaries rather than individualized assessments. All bureaucrats in the municipality were invited; attendance was voluntary; bureaucrats retained control of the agenda; mayors were not permitted to attend, though bureaucrats could invite additional participants (councilors, civil-society representatives, central-government officials, media). Control municipalities held no such sessions. Outcomes are measured from a municipality-year administrative audit panel (2014–2019; treatment effects estimated with municipality and year fixed effects) and an endline bureaucrat survey (December 2016).

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization in office by a computer
Randomization unit
Randomization was at the municipality level: 20 municipalities, drawn from the country's 77 municipalities, were randomly assigned to treatment (10) or control (10).
Clusters
20 municipalities (10 treatment, 10 control)
Observations
Administrative audit panel: 120 municipality-years (20 municipalities × 6 years, 2014–2019). Endline bureaucrat survey: 600 bureaucrats (30 per municipality).
Arms
Clusters: 10 treatment municipalities, 10 control. Bureaucrat survey: 299 treatment, 296 control.
Primary outcomes
Municipal performance, measured as the annual CoNaFiL audit-based performance score (the municipality's total score as a percentage of the maximum attainable score based on rules), built from three components---record keeping, transparency in public procurement, and overall administrative management (municipality-year panel, 2014--2019).
Secondary outcomes
From the audit reports (municipality-year, 2014–2019): (a) Financial irregularities — any financial irregularity; value of irregularities as a % of FADeC received; any ineligible project; and an aggregate irregularity index. (b) Procurement — the number and share of contracts awarded through open vs. restricted procedures (restricted = restricted tender + restricted consultation); and a procurement openness index. (c) Project implementation — the shares of works projects halted, abandoned, and ongoing (overall and split by carried-over vs. new contract); and an implementation index. (d) Investment composition — sectoral shares of FADeC investment; the share allocated to service-delivery sectors vs. the municipality's own administration; and a social allocation index. (e) Funding and budget execution — total FADeC received; the commitment (engagement) rate; the payment (mandatement) rate. From the endline bureaucrat survey (December 2016): (f) Beliefs about the rule of law — perceptions of whether rules are followed (for equipment procurement, public procurement, and recruitment) and of corruption (among councilors, city-hall vendors, and colleagues), combined into a single index (corruption reverse-coded). (g) Internal meeting practices — the number of meetings held/attended within the administration, and the topics discussed (in particular, whether meetings covered the audit report and corruption). (h) Interpersonal trust — trust in councilors, office colleagues, colleagues within the same department, and city-hall colleagues, combined into a single index. Downstream (citizens): (i) Citizen-experience index, constructed from Afrobarometer rounds 6 (2014) and 7 (2017).

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Keywords