Striking to be Productive: An Experimental Study of Collective Exit Threats and Centralized Redistribution

How to cite

Schimmer, Malte. 2026. "Striking to be Productive: An Experimental Study of Collective Exit Threats and Centralized Redistribution." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0019251. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19251-1.0

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Malte Schimmer*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0019251
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19251-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2026-07-27 – 2026-08-07
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/19251

Abstract

We study whether a collective exit option (the right to strike) affects productivity in an experimental labor market with centralized redistribution. In a repeated game with groups of four (one employer, three workers), workers generate income through a real-effort slider task, subject to a minimum performance requirement backed by a financial penalty. All income from each round is pooled with the employer, who redistributes it freely among all members of the group after observing individual performance. In the treatment condition, workers can vote by majority to strike, suspending the next round's working phase. The strike option gives workers a collective threat that may protect them against expropriation and thereby sustain effort. We test whether the option raises worker effort per working phase, how it affects total group output net of production lost to realized strikes, whether it disciplines employer redistribution, and whether the resulting output gains leave employers themselves better off.

Experimental design

Between-subject laboratory experiment with two conditions (Baseline, Collective Exit), one session per condition (12:00 and 16:00 on the same day), 60 participants (15 groups of 4) each. Within sessions, participants are randomly assigned to groups and to roles (1 employer, 3 workers), fixed for the entire session. Groups are the independent unit of observation; because each condition is run in a single session, treatment effects cannot be statistically separated from session-level effects, and inference relies on the 15 independent groups per condition. The experiment is computerized in oTree. The number of rounds is stochastic (minimum 10, then 20% ending probability per round). After the game ends, participants complete a short questionnaire (age, gender, field of study, general risk attitude).

Design details

Randomization method
Treatment is assigned at the session level in a fixed order: one Baseline session and one Collective Exit session, conducted sequentially on the same day at the WISO Research Laboratory of the University of Hamburg. Participants register via the laboratory's standard recruitment system without knowledge of the experimental condition. Within sessions, the oTree software randomly assigns participants to groups and roles.
Randomization unit
Session (condition); individual (group and role assignment within session).
Clusters
30 groups (15 per condition)
Observations
120 participants (90 workers, 30 employers); approximately 1,260 worker-round and 420 group-round observations at an expected game length of aprox. 14 rounds.
Arms
60 participants (15 groups) Baseline; 60 participants (15 groups) Collective Exit.
Primary outcomes
1. Worker productivity per conducted working phase: number of correctly completed sliders per worker per working phase in which work took place (excluding strike rounds). 2. Total group output per round: sum of worker-generated ECU per group per round, averaged over all rounds including strike rounds (in which output is zero), before the employer multiplier.
Secondary outcomes
Total group surplus per round including the employer multiplier (welfare measure; the redistributed pool); worker share of redistributed income per round and the employer's self-allocated share; cumulative payoffs by role; within-group payoff inequality (employer-to-mean-worker payoff ratio; Gini coefficient of cumulative payoffs across all 4 members); employer redistribution style measured by three continuous indices (within-round Spearman correlation between worker effort and allocation; coefficient of variation of worker allocations; average self-allocated share); strike rate, passed strike votes, individual voting, strike duration and timing (treatment only); share of worker-rounds below the 20-slider minimum; share of rounds in which the employer's clicker threshold is met; worker effort in round t as a function of the share received in round t−1; time trends and first-round effects. Post-experimental questionnaire (age, gender, field of study, general risk attitude 0–10) is used for covariates and balance checks.

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Keywords