Opaque Admissions: Preference Intensity, Cutoff Information, and Reporting in Centralized Admissions
How to cite
Yurko, Anna. 2026. "Opaque Admissions: Preference Intensity, Cutoff Information, and Reporting in Centralized Admissions." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0019224. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19224-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Centralized university admissions systems often ask applicants to submit rank-order lists, but applicants may have limited information about how these lists are processed. Even in systems that use strategy-proof mechanisms such as deferred acceptance (DA), applicants may observe admission thresholds and relative program competitiveness without understanding whether it is safe to rank ambitious options first. This experiment studies how participants report preferences in opaque settings, how historical threshold information and transparent DA guidance affect their reports, and how alternative assignment rules perform when applied to the resulting behavior.
The experiment uses a neutral prize-allocation setting that preserves the main strategic features of centralized admissions while reducing the influence of participants’ prior admissions experiences. Participants rank a small set of alternatives. They share the same ordinal preferences but differ in the intensity of their preferences, allowing the study to test whether submitted rankings respond to cardinal incentives. Participants make ranking decisions at different priority levels with no interim feedback in a controlled competitive environment.
The design has three treatments: an opaque mechanism with no historical thresholds, an opaque mechanism with historical threshold information, and historical thresholds combined with a transparent DA cutoff/menu description. The experiment tests whether participants report truthfully or use safety-oriented heuristics, and whether these distortions are insensitive to cardinal payoffs or vary with preference intensity in ways consistent with immediate acceptance (IA)-like reasoning or nonstandard preferences. Elicited mechanism beliefs are interpreted together with ranking decisions as complementary evidence on these possible explanations. The experiment also tests whether transparent DA guidance increases truthful reporting and weakens safety-oriented distortions. Finally, estimated reporting rules are used in a secondary fixed-behavior counterfactual that applies DA and IA to the same behaviorally generated reports and compares their welfare and priority-violation outcomes under realistic limited-information conditions.
Intervention
The intervention varies the information environment in which participants submit rank-order lists in a centralized assignment task. All participants face the same prize-allocation problem, share the same ordinal ranking but differ in cardinal preferences over three prize types, and receive information about the available prize types and capacities, the number of competitors, the distribution of priority scores, and their own payoffs and priority score. Treatments differ in the additional information provided about the assignment environment. In Treatment 1, the mechanism is opaque, and no historical thresholds are shown. In Treatment 2, the mechanism remains opaque, but participants observe historical admission thresholds. In Treatment 3, they observe the same thresholds and also receive transparent deferred-acceptance guidance using cutoff/menu language that explains how submitted rankings are processed and discourages the strategic demotion of a truly preferred option.
Experimental design
This is an individual-level laboratory experiment on reporting behavior in a centralized admissions problem. Participants complete a neutral prize-allocation task with three prize types, score-based priority, equal prize capacities, and possible non-assignment. All participants share the same ordinal preferences over prizes, but differ in the cardinal value of the middle prize. Subjects submit rank-order lists for several prespecified priority scores that are common across subjects but presented in random order with no interim feedback. One submitted list and score are randomly selected for payment. Experimental variation comes from three information treatments that differ in whether the mechanism is opaque, whether historical threshold information is shown, and whether deferred-acceptance cutoff/menu guidance is provided. The design isolates the effect of information on preference reporting by holding the competitive environment fixed through computerized opponents.
Design details
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