Demand for Options as Price Insurance

How to cite

Silver, Jedediah; Maggio, Daniel; Agness, Daniel. 2026. "Demand for Options as Price Insurance." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0019208. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19208-1.0

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Jedediah Silver* , Daniel Maggio , Daniel Agness

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0019208
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19208-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2026-08-04 – 2027-03-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
O13, O16, G52
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/19208

Abstract

Maize prices in Malawi rise sharply between the harvest and the lean season, but the size of the increase varies widely across years, exposing both net buyers and net sellers to substantial price risk in their main staple. No standard financial product to insure rural households against this risk is widely available. We elicit incentivized willingness to pay (WTP) for maize options contracts — calls that cap the price households pay and puts that floor the price they receive — among 224 households in Zomba district, Malawi. Each household completes Becker–DeGroot–Marschak elicitations for six contracts covering the 2026-2027 lean season: calls and puts at each of three strike prices. One contract is then randomly selected and offered at a randomly drawn premium; households purchase coverage whenever their stated WTP weakly exceeds the draw, ensuring that households are choosing over real contracts. We separately elicit WTP to extend the coverage window, and we randomize whether the participation reward is delivered immediately or during the lean season, testing whether liquidity at the time of purchase constrains demand. Comparing WTP to actuarially fair premia computed from 22 seasons of market price data, as well as households' beliefs over the upcoming lean season's prices, provides a revealed-preference measure of the costs associated with seasonal price risk. If demand is sufficiently high, the results will inform the design of a subsequent randomized evaluation of the effects of options coverage on household consumption, storage, and marketing behavior.

Intervention

We offer options contracts to buy and sell maize during the lean season to rural Malawian households. A call contract gives a household the right, but not the obligation, to buy maize from a service provider at a pre-specified strike price during the lean season, capping its effective purchase price. A put contract gives the right to sell at a pre-specified floor price, guaranteeing a minimum sales price for households storing maize. Because the contracts are covered by physical grain stores held by the provider, they avoid the counterparty cash-flow problems that would make a traditional insurance instrument on prices infeasible.

This study is a demand-elicitation pilot that measures households' willingness-to-pay for the described contracts. Any downstream RCT will be registered and pre-specified separately before any endline data collection.

Experimental design

The study elicits households’ willingness to pay for maize options contracts that vary in contract type and strike price. Contract presentation order is randomized, and one contract and premium are randomly selected for potential implementation, making the choices real-stakes. We also randomize the timing of survey participation payments and separately elicit demand for a longer coverage window. This pilot does not include an endline study of downstream outcomes.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization built in to programmed survey
Randomization unit
Participation-payment timing and presentation order are randomized at the respondent level. The contract and premium selected for implementation are randomized within respondent by the programmed survey.
Clusters
28 villages
Observations
224 households, with 6 contract elicitations each.
Arms
One contract to be selected per household; Approximately 112 households assigned to early or late survey incentive.
Primary outcomes
Willingness to pay for options contracts, elasticity of demand with respect to strike price
Secondary outcomes
1. Elasticities of units of coverage purchased w.r.t premia, conditioning on winning; 2. Effect of participation-payment timing on demand; 3. Willingness to pay to extend the coverage window to include November and December; 4. Subjective price expectation coherence; 5. Heterogeneity by maize position; 6. Bunching around the incentive payment.
Sponsors
Name: The Weiss Fund for Research in Development Economics Location: University of Chicago Url: https://weissfund.uchicago.edu/
Partners
Name: PALM Consulting Limited Partner_type: private_company Url: https://palmconsulting.mw/

Cited by

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Keywords