Demand for Options as Price Insurance
How to cite
Silver, Jedediah; Maggio, Daniel; Agness, Daniel. 2026. "Demand for Options as Price Insurance." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0019208. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19208-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Maize prices in Malawi rise sharply between the harvest and the lean season, but the size of the increase varies widely across years, exposing both net buyers and net sellers to substantial price risk in their main staple. No standard financial product to insure rural households against this risk is widely available. We elicit incentivized willingness to pay (WTP) for maize options contracts — calls that cap the price households pay and puts that floor the price they receive — among 224 households in Zomba district, Malawi. Each household completes Becker–DeGroot–Marschak elicitations for six contracts covering the 2026-2027 lean season: calls and puts at each of three strike prices. One contract is then randomly selected and offered at a randomly drawn premium; households purchase coverage whenever their stated WTP weakly exceeds the draw, ensuring that households are choosing over real contracts. We separately elicit WTP to extend the coverage window, and we randomize whether the participation reward is delivered immediately or during the lean season, testing whether liquidity at the time of purchase constrains demand. Comparing WTP to actuarially fair premia computed from 22 seasons of market price data, as well as households' beliefs over the upcoming lean season's prices, provides a revealed-preference measure of the costs associated with seasonal price risk. If demand is sufficiently high, the results will inform the design of a subsequent randomized evaluation of the effects of options coverage on household consumption, storage, and marketing behavior.
Intervention
We offer options contracts to buy and sell maize during the lean season to rural Malawian households. A call contract gives a household the right, but not the obligation, to buy maize from a service provider at a pre-specified strike price during the lean season, capping its effective purchase price. A put contract gives the right to sell at a pre-specified floor price, guaranteeing a minimum sales price for households storing maize. Because the contracts are covered by physical grain stores held by the provider, they avoid the counterparty cash-flow problems that would make a traditional insurance instrument on prices infeasible.
This study is a demand-elicitation pilot that measures households' willingness-to-pay for the described contracts. Any downstream RCT will be registered and pre-specified separately before any endline data collection.
Experimental design
The study elicits households’ willingness to pay for maize options contracts that vary in contract type and strike price. Contract presentation order is randomized, and one contract and premium are randomly selected for potential implementation, making the choices real-stakes. We also randomize the timing of survey participation payments and separately elicit demand for a longer coverage window. This pilot does not include an endline study of downstream outcomes.
Design details
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