Beyond carbon: Multi-attribute market design for ecosystem services
How to cite
Kark, Peleg; Friesen, Lana; MacKenzie, Ian; Quiggin, John. 2026. "Beyond carbon: Multi-attribute market design for ecosystem services." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0019204. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19204-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This study investigates the relative efficiency and performance of alternative designs for multi-attribute markets. We compare credit stacking and bundling of environmental offsets where heterogeneous landholders simultaneously supply multiple ecosystem services. Our theoretical framework demonstrates that pure bundling violates Tinbergen’s rule and generates an inefficient pooling equilibrium. Conversely, we prove that offering a menu of bundles can restore the first-best separating equilibrium. To empirically test these theoretical results, we implement a double-auction laboratory experiment across four institutional treatments: (i) independent markets (unbundled stacking), (ii) pure bundling, (iii) an optimally weighted menu of bundles, and (iv) a sub-optimally weighted menu. Across treatments, we vary production complementarity and specialisation levels (with two values per parameter) across three repeated rounds per session. We provide actionable insights, grounded in our theoretical results and behavioural data, to inform the design and implementation of emerging national and international multi-attribute environmental markets.
Experimental design
This study employs a laboratory experiment conducted in a standard university experimental economics lab, with participants recruited from a broader student population. Participants will be part of a single group of eight participants for the duration of the experiment.
The main experimental task involves subjects making decisions about how many units of multiple fictitious goods to produce or purchase. Each unit produced generates a cost, and each unit purchased has an associated value. Subjects will engage in trade of each good via a double auction market design. Subjects’ earnings will be proportional to the profits they make from trading goods. Subjects will have different roles as either buyers or sellers, which are fixed for the duration of the experiment. Each type of buyer or seller varies in its production costs or consumption values.
We will consider four between-subject institutional treatments: (i) a stacking design where each good is traded in independent markets, (ii) a pure bundling design with a single bundle containing one unit of each good, (iii) a bundling menu design with two different bundles containing different numbers of units of each good (with optimal weights), and (iv) a bundling menu design with sub-optimal weights. Within each treatment, we systematically vary producer specialisation and joint-production complementarity parameters (with two different values per parameter). Each specialisation-complementarity parameter pair is repeated for three rounds per session.
To control for subject heterogeneity in our regression analysis, participants complete a standard demographic questionnaire following the main experimental task.
Design details
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