AI Assistance, Social Preferences, and Beliefs in Economic Games
How to cite
Jiang, Xin; Ye, Bohan. 2026. "AI Assistance, Social Preferences, and Beliefs in Economic Games." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0019198. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19198-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This study examines whether access to AI assistance changes human decisions, beliefs, and reasoning in canonical economic games. Participants complete dictator-game, trust-game, and public-goods decisions first without AI assistance and then with the option to consult an AI assistant. The main analysis compares matched within-subject decisions across the no-AI and AI-assist conditions, with secondary analyses of belief revision, heterogeneity by baseline beliefs and reasons, and the content of AI prompts.
Intervention
Participants in the AI-assist condition are allowed to consult an AI assistant before submitting decisions in the dictator game, trust game, and public-goods game. The interface asks participants to record the prompt they gave to the AI assistant and the AI response. Participants may choose not to use AI assistance. In the no-AI condition, participants complete the same economic-game decisions without AI assistance.
Experimental design
This study uses a two-arm sequence design. In both arms, participants first complete the same set of economic-game tasks without AI assistance. Participants are then assigned to one of two second-wave conditions.
In the control arm, participants complete the tasks again without AI assistance: no AI -> no AI. In the AI-assist arm, participants complete the tasks again with access to AI assistance: no AI -> AI.
The economic-game tasks include a dictator game, a trust game, and a public-goods game. Participants are matched across the two waves using a study identifier.
Design details
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