Tocqueville’s "Free School": How Adjudicative Engagement Reshapes User Behaviors in Online Marketplaces?
How to cite
Xu, Mingwei; He, Guojun. 2026. "Tocqueville’s "Free School": How Adjudicative Engagement Reshapes User Behaviors in Online Marketplaces?." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0019174. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19174-1.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This study asks whether taking part in resolving other people's disputes changes how individuals behave in their own economic dealings. A classic idea, dating to Tocqueville's account of the American jury, holds that serving as a lay adjudicator acts as a "school of citizenship" that builds trust and respect for shared rules, while a competing view holds that an inside look at how rules and evidence are weighed instead teaches people how to work the system to their own advantage. The question has been hard to answer because real-world participation in judicial decision-making is rare and seldom random. We study it on the community adjudication feature of a large online secondhand marketplace, where ordinary users are invited to help decide disputes. In a randomized controlled trial, we invite a randomly selected group of users who have never served to participate, and compare their subsequent platform behavior with that of a control group.
Intervention
Among eligible users of an online secondhand marketplace who have never served as community adjudicators, we randomly select a treatment group to receive an invitation to participate in the platform's peer dispute-resolution feature. The invitation is delivered through the platform's normal notification system. Users in the treatment group are free to accept or decline; the remaining eligible users form the control group and receive no such invitation during the study period. The intervention therefore assigns the opportunity and encouragement to serve as an adjudicator.
Experimental design
We conduct an individually randomized controlled trial on the peer dispute resolution feature of a large online secondhand marketplace, where ordinary users can be invited to help decide disputes between buyers and sellers. From a pool of recently active eligible users who have never previously served as adjudicators, we randomly assign users to a treatment group and a control group at a 1:1 ratio. Treatment users receive an invitation, delivered through the platform's standard notification system, encouraging them to serve as an adjudicator. Control users receive no such invitation during the study period. Take up is voluntary, so the invitation functions as an encouragement rather than compelled participation. After the intervention, we track and compare the two groups' subsequent behavior on the platform, focusing on their conduct as buyers and sellers, their behavior in disputes, and their broader engagement with the platform community. The design allows us to estimate the causal effect of the invitation to serve, and, using the random invitation as an instrument for actual participation, the causal effect of adjudication itself on subsequent economic behavior.
Design details
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