Uncertainty and Gendered Application Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment

How to cite

Sarkar, Angela; Ahmed, Tutan. 2026. "Uncertainty and Gendered Application Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0019146. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19146-1.0

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Angela Sarkar* , Tutan Ahmed

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0019146
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19146-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2026-08-03 – 2027-01-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
J16; J31; J71; O15
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/19146

Abstract

Theoretical predictions and empirical evidence on the effect of uncertainty on gendered labor market outcomes are contradictory. Existing findings on ambiguity aversion are mostly based on laboratory studies with limited external validity. We leverage the real hiring process of a collaborating engineering consultancy firm in India, which hires candidates conditional on winning tenders, a naturally ambiguous hiring environment. We study six job titles with balanced and unbalanced gender representation and randomly vary the timing and content of conditional hiring information disclosed to job seekers. We float each position weekly over months on India’s largest online job portal. We examine causal effects of this ambiguity on (a) application behavior thrpugh application rates, search effort, and withdrawal behaivour and (b) negotiation strategies, as measured by asking salaries. We test whether: (i) female job seekers exhibit greater ambiguity aversion through lower application rates under conditional hiring information, (ii) gender gaps attenuate in female-dominated occupations consistent with occupational gender norms; and (iii) applicants with prior exposure to tender-based hiring respond differently, applying at higher rates and negotiating higher salaries. Our proposed study provides causal field evidence on gendered ambiguity aversion and its implications for firms that use unconventional conditional hiring processes in an emerging economy.

Intervention

Building on the naturally uncertain hiring setting, we randomly vary the content and timing of hiring-related information disclosed to job seekers who have expressed interest in the firm's advertised positions. We measure the effects on application continuation, search effort, document submission, and salary negotiation. Full details of the information conditions will be released upon trial completion

Experimental design

We collaborate with a small (20–99 employee) engineering consultancy firm in eastern India that hires project staff conditionally. Job titles reflecting the firm's hiring demand, spanning female-dominated, male-dominated, and gender-neutral occupations across multiple regions of India, are advertised across online job boards for at least 10 days each, with standard job descriptions and no mention of conditional hiring. From the resulting pool of interested candidates for each job title, individuals are randomly assigned to information conditions related to uncertain hiring conditions. Comparing each against control identifies the total effect of uncertainty disclosure. Outcomes on continuation, search effort, document submission, and negotiation are drawn from portal administrative data, the firm's recruitment records, and an applicant survey that also elicits ambiguity and risk attitudes, prior experience with conditional hiring, and expected salaries.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization is done in office by a computer
Randomization unit
Individual job seeker (within job-title pools) Within each job-title applicant pool, individuals are randomly assigned in equal thirds to the three information arms, stratified by job title and by gender within each pool. This guarantees treatment balance for the primary Female × Treatment parameter. The disclosed probabilities in the risk arm derive from the firm's historical tender bid success record and short-term-to-permanent conversion rate, which the firm documented prior to randomization.
Clusters
Not applicable in the clustered-treatment sense (individual-level randomization). Stratification units: 6 job-title pools across regions.
Observations
Approximately 8,100 individual job seekers in total across six job titles (≈ 1,350 per title).
Arms
The overall sample size is approximately 2,700 per arm, resulting in 450 per arm within each job title.
Primary outcomes
Continuation in the hiring process versus withdrawal following information disclosure (application rate on the extensive margin). Asking salary: lower bound, upper bound, and median of the stated expected wage range. Wage surplus: the proportional difference between the average industry wage and the expected median salary, (W − w)/W.
Secondary outcomes
Search effort includes the time spent on the application (standardized), the proportion of the application/questionnaire completed, survey completeness, and proactive HR contact (calls/messages). Expressed interest but documents not returned; display of dissent; withdrawal at later hiring stages. Entry into negotiation (binary).

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Keywords